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ASSESSING THE HARMLESSNESS OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR-
A PROCESS IN NEED OF A RATIONALE
MARTHA A. FIELDt
In Chapman v. California,' the Supreme Court announced
some fundamental principles shaping the law of harmless con-
stitutional error in criminal proceedings. First, the Court ended
an aged assumption that constitutional error would always re-
quire reversal if the Supreme Court reviewed the case.2 Next,
the Court ruled that in cases containing federal constitutional
error the standard of harmlessness is a federal question, not a
matter of state law.3 Finally, the Court placed the burden on "the
beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained."
4
Although Supreme Court cases have followed these princi-
ples rather consistently since Chapman,5 the problem of the con-
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1 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
2 See id. at 42-45 (Stewart, J., concurring). The only case in which the Court had
found constitutional error harmless was Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900)
(involving testimony, violative of the sixth amendment confrontation clause, introduced
against a defendant who admitted his guilt at trial). The case is discussed in text accom-
panying notes 82-86 infra.
State courts had not shared the Supreme Court's reluctance to hold that federal
constitutional errors were harmless. See note 65 infra & accompanying text.
3 Justice Harlan dissented vigorously on this point. 386 U.S. at 45-54. He believed
that harmless constitutional error rules, like other state court procedural rules, should
be overturned only if they violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
by being fundamentally unfair. Apparently he would have considered the approaches
to harmless error discussed in this Article legitimate alternatives among which the states
might freely choose.
Justice Harlan dissented alone, and his view has not reappeared.
4 Id. at 24.
The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt formulation has been retained, at least in form,
although one might question its application in particular factual settings. See, e.g.,
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1972), discussed in text accompanying notes
94-101 infra; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969), discussed in notes 76, 87
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:15
tent of the federal standard has not been explicitly addressed.
Granted the necessity of showing harmlessness beyond a reason-
able doubt, the question remains how to make the showing of
harmlessness. At least three possibilites for demonstrating harm-
lessness appear in Supreme Court opinions:
1. The first approach focuses upon the erroneously admit-
ted evidence (or other constitutional error)6 to ask whether
it might have contributed to a guilty verdict.
2. The second approach asks whether, once erroneously
admitted evidence is excluded, there remains overwhelming
evidence to support the jury's verdict.
3. The third approach asks whether the tainted evidence is
merely cumulative-that is, merely duplicative of some re-
maining admissible evidence.
Supreme Court opinions often do not distinguish betv~een
these variant approaches, although the approach selected can
change the disposition of many cases. At times the Court ap-
pears to have endorsed the second and third approaches to
harmless error, although it sometimes seems to favor the first
approach standing alone. I believe that harmlessness should be
found only when either the first test or a carefully circum-
scribed version of the third is satisfied. At the outset, this Article
will define and discuss the first two approaches to harmless
error and the Supreme Court cases on the subject. It will then
develop and analyze the third approach.
7
I. POLAR POSITIONS ON THE DEFINITION OF
HARMLESSNESS-THE FIRST AND SECOND APPROACHES
The first two positions defining harmless error can be seen
as opposite extremes. The first approach requires examining the
erroneously admitted evidence, without regard to the weight of
other evidence, to determine whether the error might have
swayed the factfinder and contributed to the verdict. The second
& text accompanying notes 69-75 infra; In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 123-24, 63
Cal. Rptr. 233, 239 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 938 (1968), discussed in note 101 infra.
6 Through most of this Article, reference will be made to erroneously admitted
evidence in discussing errors which may be harmless. The harmless error discussion,
however, is relevant as well to constitutional errors that occur at trial other than the
erroneous introduction of unconstitutional evidence.
Although this Article will discuss harmless constitutional error in criminal trials,
much of the general analysis, including the classification of types of error and the dis-
cussion of the difficulties involved in the various tests for harmlessness, is applicable by
analogy to a broader range of harmless error problems.
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position does not look to the tainted evidence, but to the un-
tainted evidence, and asks whether it alone compels a verdict of
guilty. An example will illustrate the difference between the two
approaches: in a case in which the constitutional error con-
cerned evidence likely to be influential with a jury-such as an
erroneously admitted confession-but in which there was also
other overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the error
could not be deemed harmless under the first approach but
would be harmless under the second.
In this situation, where the error appears harmful even out
of context, the difference between the two approaches is evident:
the first approach looks only to the improperly admitted evi-
dence, whereas the second looks only to the properly admitted
evidence. In some cases, however, the line between the two is less
obvious. The difficulty arises because it is not always possible to
determine, by viewing an error in isolation, whether the error
could have affected the factfinder. The impact of illegally admit-
ted evidence in a particular case is sometimes apparent only after
examining its interaction with properly admitted evidence. Ad-
mission of an exculpatory statement obtained in violation of the
fifth amendment might not appear prejudicial by itself. But an
examination of other evidence in the case might reveal inconsis-
tencies damaging to the defendant-for example, if the state-
ment claimed an alibi that the alibi witness denied at trial. The
first approach may, then, require assessing an error in context.8
8 The first approach, assessing harmfulness by looking only to the erroneously ad-
mitted evidence, varies considerably, then, according to how one defines "the errone-
ously admitted evidence." In the example in text, "the erroneously admitted evidence"
could be described as "evidence admitted in violation of the fifth amendment"; or as
"exculpatory statements admitted in violation of the fifth amendment"; or as
"exculpatory statements admitted in violation of the fifth amendment that are refuted
at trial," and so on. Because the various possible forms of the first approach can lead to
different results, it is important as well to establish a principle of selection between
them. In the above example, in which an exculpatory statement appeared harmless in
itself but was in fact damaging in the context of the case, it seems obvious that the
conviction should be overturned because the error actually was of significance. This
would seem to suggest that in order to determine harmlessness the rule defining "er-
roneously admitted evidence" should look to the operation of the erroneously admitted
evidence in its particular context rather than to the evidence in isolation. In cases in
which a determination of harmfulness can be made at a more generalized level, how-
ever, the latter approach will result in an economy of effort. If one is willing to adopt a
rule, for example, that the absence of counsel at trial or that the admission of an un-
constitutionally obtained confession cannot be deemed harmless, it would be unneces-
sary to examine the impact of the error in the particular case. Or if one declines to
adopt a generic rule with respect to confessions but adjudges a particular confession,
viewed apart from the rest of the evidence, as harmful, it will also be harmful, for
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Though not always wholly irrelevant even under the first
approach, the properly admitted evidence is relevant there in a
very different way than it is under the second, or overwhelming
evidence, test. For when the first approach requires examination
of the properly admitted evidence, the concern is solely to trace
the impact of the erroneously admitted evidence. The untainted
evidence is not weighed in its own right, nor is it examined to see
if it is cumulative with the tainted evidence; it is considered only
to uncover the potentially damaging ramifications of the error.
It is that fact that distinguishes "the first approach" in my analysis
from "the second approach," where the crucial inquiry is
whether the untainted evidence, considered independently of
the tainted evidence, would in any event compel a verdict of
guilty. Only the weight of the admissible evidence is relevant to
that inquiry; the erroneously admitted evidence is irrelevant.
Whichever approach one follows, the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard can apply. Looking at the error itself, one can
require certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that it would not
influence a jury; focusing on the other evidence, one can require
certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that it compels a guilty
verdict.9 Given Chapman v. California,'° the beyond-a-reason-
purposes of the first approach, when its interaction with the rest of the evidence is
traced. Only when an error seems harmless apart from its context is it necessary, under
this approach, to engage in the more extended inquiry whether other evidence makes it
harmful. Not only may it be time-consuming to resolve that problem; its resolution will
provide less guidance for future cases.
Economy of effort might suggest that a court always should inquire first whether
an error generically is harmful and then proceed to the more particularized inquiries
only if that question is answered in the negative. A court sometimes, however, might
wish to avoid deciding whether errors under a particular constitutional provision are
invariably prejudicial. In Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), for example, the
court deferred the question whether an illegal search and seizure, or indeed any con-
stitutional error, could ever be harmless. Instead it chose to render a decision with less
precedential impact by focusing on the facts of the case. See id. at 86.
9 In order to comply with constitutional demands, an "other evidence" test must, of
course, look for overwhelming evidence-such evidence that the jury would necessarily
find the defendant guilty. Sufficient evidence to convict, once the tainted evidence is
removed, is inadequate to support a finding of harmless error, because a jury may
acquit though the evidence is sufficient to refer the case to it. See Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963). At common law, however, appellate courts would not reverse
criminal convictions because of trial error if they believed the jury had reached the
correct result on the basis of sufficient evidence. That rule was altered in 1835 by the
Court of Exchequer, in an opinion later read to have adopted a position at the opposite
extreme: a rule of automatic reversal fortany error, however technical or trivial. Crease
v. Barrett, 1 C.M. & R. 919, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835). This rule was eventually
modified both in England and the United States. See generally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE
OF HARMLESS ERROR 1-26 (1970); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at 364-68 (3d ed.
1940).
10 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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able-doubt standard should be applied whichever approach is se-
lected. But it is important as well to select between the two ap-
proaches, or to decide that yet another is mandated, because
the different standards can lead to conflicting dispositions
of the same case. In the case described above, involving both
an improper confession and other overwhelming evidence of
guilt, the conviction would be reversible under the first approach
but not the second. A situation requiring reversal under the
overwhelming evidence test but not under the first approach
also seems logically possible: examining a constitutional error
might convince one that it could not have influenced the
verdict," but the other evidence in the case, though sufficient to
sustain the verdict, might be short of overwhelming. Although
application of the second approach alone would dictate reversal
in such a case, it is unlikely that a court would reverse when the
error itself is so unimportant that it could not have influenced
the result. If this is true, the second approach supplements the
first rather than presenting an alternative to it. The inquiry,
then, is whether the harmless error doctrine should apply to
sustain a conviction only when the error itself appears harmless
12
(as the first approach allows) or whether overwhelming un-
tainted evidence as well can support a finding of harmlessness.
II. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF
GENERICALLY HARMLESS ERRORS
Whether or not the overwhelming evidence test is proper,
the first approach allows a finding of harmlessness when one is
certain that an error, whether viewed in isolation or in context,
could not have influenced the result. There is, however, a group
of constitutional errors that should provide an exception to this
general rule. The violation of some constitutional rules may be
necessarily harmless:' 3 some rules generally do not have any
significant impact on the outcome of a case. While it is arguable
what rules would fall within this description, two constitutionally
based rules that might be deemed to qualify are the rule pro-
" For example, the error might concern an exculpatory statement given by a defen-
dant who had not been given his Miranda warnings. The statement, though erroneously
admitted, might be deemed not possibly to have contributed to the finding of guilt.
12" Note, however, the exception for harmlessness of the generic variety. See text
accompanying notes 13-19 infra.
'" Cf. notes 54-60 infra & accompanying text, which concern rules whose violation is
necessarily harmful and that accordingly lead to automatic reversal.
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hibiting discrimination in jury selection and the rule prohibiting
comment on a defendant's failure to testify. In the first example,
the argument would be that discriminatory elimination of one
group does not influence the result of a trial, absent a showing
of bias on the part of those who served. 1 4 In the latter example,
one would argue that commenting on the defendant's failure to
testify simply tells jury members what they have in any case
observed.' 5
As a result of a finding of "generic harmlessness," one might
be tempted to conclude that the test of harmless-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt is satisfied and that no reversal for error is re-
quired. If that argument were accepted with regard to either
example above, however, the result would be effectively to over-
turn the constitutional rule;"6 if violation of a rule is generically
harmless and cannot lead to reversal, then unless some other
means of enforcing the rule is provided, it will be reduced to an
empty exhortation.' 7 That one could reach a conclusion of
harmlessness does not necessarily argue for repeal of the rule,
for rules may serve purposes apart from their effect on the
outcome of a particular trial. In the case of discrimination injury
selection, the purpose, at least in part, is to prevent the offense
to the dignity of excluded groups of citizens that would result
from their elimination.' 8 The rule prohibiting comment on fail-
ure to testify may well respresent a judgment that although the
comment is likely to have minimal impact on the outcome, the
absence of affirmative justification for the comment warrants its
prohibition.
If these are the purposes behind the suggested rules, it is
obviously nonsensical to apply a harmless error test to them.
Indeed, the examples suggest that the harmless error doctrine
14But cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
15Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 55 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16 Indeed the suggested rationale for holding Griffin violations harmless was urged
in Griffin as an argument against adopting the rule in the first instance. Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); id. at 621-22 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
17 The fact that the plaintiff has not been harmed also might preclude a civil rights
action against state officials who violated the rule. In the jury selection example, how-
ever, another remedy does exist, though quaere whether it would be sufficiently effec-
tive as the sole remedy: excluded groups of citizens may bring a class action charging
discriminatory exclusion and, if successful, they may obtain an injunction against con-
tinuation of the practice. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
'8 See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970);
Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
308 (1880).
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should be deemed inapplicable to generically harmless constitu-
tional rules. Instead, the seemingly paradoxical approach should
be adopted that violations of such rules result in automatic re-
versal, for another result would effectively overturn the constitu-
tional rules. 19
III. THE CASE LAW CONCERNING
THE Two APPROACHES
The case law is not wholly coherent concerning the propri-
ety of finding harmlessness in cases in which there are possibly
damaging constitutional errors but also other overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt. On the whole, however, the cases support the
propriety of an overwhelming evidence test.
A. Milton v. Wainwright and the
Existence of an Overwhelming Evidence Test
The case most clearly adopting the position that the "over-
whelming evidence" test is a proper means to ascertain harm-
lessness is Milton v. Wainwright.20 A police officer, Langford, had
testified at Milton's trial concerning statements Milton had made
to him relating the details of the crime. The statements were
made to Officer Langford after Milton had been indicted and
had obtained counsel and while Langford, posing as a fellow
19 By the same token, violations of per se rules that the Supreme Court has estab-
lished should result in automatic reversal if application of a harmless error standard
would essentially alter the constitutional rule itself. If, for example, a failure to give
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966), is harmless when
the suspect is aware of his rights or is not indigent, as some courts have held, see State v.
Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968); State v. Carpenter, 211 Kan. 234, 505 P.2d 753 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Wilbur, 353 Mass. 376, 231 N.E.2d 919 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1010 (1968); People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157, 242 N.E.2d 830, 295 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1968),
that vitiates the per se quality of the Miranda rule, which requires warning even when
persons are aware of their rights or are able to afford counsel. The issue concerning a
confession obtained in violation of Miranda must be whether the admission of the confes-
sion was harmless-i.e., whether it had no effect-and not whether it was harmless to
obtain it illegally. See People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 729-31, 401 P.2d 665, 673-74,
44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 201-02 (1965). See also Ibsen v. State, 83 Nev. 42, 422 P.2d 543
(1967). An analogous point can be made about Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458
(1900), in which a written accusation made at a preliminary hearing was introduced in
evidence at trial, after the witness had escaped. In order to assess whether this violation
of the confrontation clause was harmless, one must ask whether the result of the trial
might have differed if the statement was not used in evidence; it is not proper to ask
whether it would have differed if the witness had not escaped and had been available to
testify, an inquiry that would overturn the finding of constitutional error in the first
instance.
20 407 U.S. 371 (1972). The result in Milton could also be explained by the cumula-
tive evidence test, discussed in text accompanying notes 69-117 infra.
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inmate, was sharing Milton's cell. In ruling on Milton's habeas
corpus petition, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether
Langford's testimony violated Milton's fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights.21 Instead, it held that "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that
the challenged testimony should have been excluded, the record
clearly reveals that any error in its admission was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. '22 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court did not deny that Langford's testimony was incrim-
inating.23 Instead, it found harmless error because "[t]hejury, in
addition to hearing the challenged testimony, was presented with
overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt, including no less
than three full confessions that were made by petitioner prior to
his indictment. ' 24 The admissibility of the earlier confessions was
not at issue. The Court's "review of the record .. . [left] no
reasonable doubt that the jury at petitioner's 1958 trial would
have reached the same verdict without hearing Langford's
testimony. '25 It thus apparently adopted the rule that erroneous
admission of even incriminating evidence may be deemed harm-
less if the court is satisfied that other evidence in the case would
in any event have led to the same result.26
21 Milton's trial antedated the Supreme Court's decision in Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The District Court had ruled against Milton on the ground
that Massiah was not retroactive, 306 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Fla. 1969), and the Court of
Appeals, concluding that the case was "of the character that does not justify oral argu-
ment," affirmed on the basis of the District Court's opinion. 428 F.2d 463, 464 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1970).
22 407 U.S. at 372.
23 In its statement of the facts, the Court said that "[tihe officer testified to in-
criminating statements made to him by petitioner . Id.24Id. at 372-73.
25 Id. at 377.
26 Another opinion unequivocally adopting the position that it is proper to deter-
mine harmlessness by focusing on the untainted evidence is the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Black in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 554 (1968). Justice Black
argued against reversing the "conviction of a defendant, because of the admission of
illegally seized evidence, where other evidence conclusively demonstrates his guilt ...."
Id. at 560. The Supreme Court reversed Bumper's conviction of felonious assault and
rape because the police had illegally obtained Bumper's rifle, which had been intro-
duced against him at trial. Bumper had allegedly used the .22-caliber rifle to force the
rape victim to succumb and then to shoot both the victim and her boyfriend. Justice
Black found the violation of the exclusionary rule harmless because "the overwhelming
evidence in this case, even when the rifle and related testimony are excluded, amply
demonstrates petitioner's guilt." Id. at 558. Justice Black's opinion did not attempt to
explain away the prejudicial impact of such a central piece of evidence and the role that
evidence played at trial.
The position on harmless constitutional error that Justice Black adopted in Bumper
could derive more from his doubts about the wisdom of the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule than from any convictions about harmless error as such. Id. at 560-61.
[Vol. 125:15
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B. The Court's Statements Casting Doubt upon
the Overwhelming Evidence Test
Fahy v. Connecticut27 and Chapman v. California,28 two of the
leading cases prior to Milton,29 cast doubt upon the propriety of
the overwhelming evidence test.3 0 Bumper v. North Carolina3' also
may be included in this group of cases. Because Milton in no way
repudiates those cases, the case law appears inconsistent, the
propriety of the overwhelming evidence test remaining an unset-
fled question. Alternatively, however, one might stress that these
pre-Milton cases do not actually compel the proposition that
focusing on the erroneously admitted evidence is the single test
for assessing harmless constitutional error. Their holdings at least
are reconcilable with the view that examining the untainted evi-
dence is another proper means of determining harmlessness,
even though in language they are far more ambiguous than
Milton in supporting this view.
Fahy v. Connecticut concerned evidence seized in violation of
the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Fahy had been con-
victed of painting swastikas on a synagogue. On appeal, the
Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that the seizure and in-
troduction at trial of a can of paint and a brush allegedly used in
the crime violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments. That
court deemed the error harmless, however, saying that the paint
and brush "were, at most, cumulative" and "[t]he transcript of
the evidence of the state's case in chief discloses overwhelming
evidence of the guilt of the defendant.
'32
The swastikas had been painted between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m.
At 4:40 a.m. an officer stopped Fahy and his codefendant in a
See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (dissenting opinion);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 70 (1967) (dissenting opinion). Moreover, Justice
Black thought that the search in Bumper was constitutionally permissible, 391 U.S. at
555-57, that the crime was "sordid," id. at 558, and that the prosecution had presented
"an open-and-shut case of guilt," id. at 565.
27 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
28 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
29 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), another important pre-Milton
harmless error case, is discussed in text accompanying notes 69-75 infra.
30 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Harrington v. California reflects that read-
ing of Chapman. 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969). See also People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550,
555, 249 N.E.2d 383, 385-86, 301 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 937 (1969)
(Fuld, C.J., dissenting); Thompson, Unconstitutional Search and Seizure and the Myth of
Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 457, 464 (1967); 30 U. PITT. L. REv. 553, 557-58
(1969).
21 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
32 375 U.S. at 93.
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car in the vicinity, discovering the paint and brush under the
front seat. Later, after he learned of the painting of the swas-
tikas, he went to Fahy's home and removed the paint and brush
from Fahy's car without a warrant. Fahy was subsequently placed
under arrest.
The Supreme Court defined its central inquiry as "whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction." 33 In concluding that
"it clearly appears that the erroneous admission of this illegally
obtained evidence was prejudicial,"34 Chief Justice Warren, writ-
ing for a majority of five, stated, "[o]bviously the tangible evi-
dence of the paint and brush was itself incriminating.
35
Moreover, the evidence "was used to corroborate [police tes-
timony] . . . as to the presence of petitioner near the scene of the
crime at about the time it was committed and as to the presence
of a can of paint and a brush in petitioner's car at that time."
36
Additional testimony showed that the illegally seized paint and
brush matched the markings on the synagogue. The tainted evi-
dence also may have prompted admissions Fahy made to the
police. Moreover, the evidence had a "cumulative prejudicial ef-
fect. . . upon the conduct of the defense at trial," for
it was only after admission of the paint and brush and
only after their subsequent use to corroborate other
state's evidence and only after introduction of the con-
fession that the defendants took the stand, admitted
their acts, and tried to establish that the nature of those
acts was not within the scope of the felony statute under
which the defendants had been charged.
37
Chapman v. California was the next major Supreme Court
case concerning harmless constitutional error. Teale and Chap-
man, convicted of robbing, kidnapping, and murdering a bar-
tender, did not take the stand in their defense, a fact upon which
the prosecuting attorney commented extensively. Similarly, the
trial judge charged the jury that it could draw all reasonable
inferences adverse to the defendants concerning information
that the defendants could reasonably be expected to deny or
3 3 d. at 86-87.
34 1d. at 91.
35Id. at 81.
36 1d. at 88.
37 d. at 91 (footnote omitted).
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explain because of facts presumably within their knowledge.
Griffin v. California,38 holding that comment on an accused's fail-
ure to testify unconstitutionally burdens his fifth amendment
right not to incriminate himself, was not decided until Chapman
was on appeal. After Griffin, the California Supreme Court con-
ceded that petitioners had been deprived of a federal constitu-
tional right but nevertheless affirmed the conviction. It found, as
to defendant Teale, that combining his admissions with "the
other substantial evidence, the proof of his guilt must be deemed
overwhelming"; as to defendant Chapman, "the persuasive, cir-
cumstantial web of evidence which implicated her was not re-
futed"; and as to both, the court was "of the opinion that in the
absence of the erroneous comments and instructions a result
more favorable to defendants was not reasonably probable in
view of the entire record . . . . and that there has been no
miscarriage of justice as to either Mrs. Chapman or Mr. Teale.
' 39
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Black, concluded that "it is completely impossible
for us to say that the State has demonstrated, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the trial judge's
instruction did not contribute to petitioners' convictions. ' 40 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court stated:
The federal rule emphasizes "substantial rights" as do
most others. The California constitutional rule em-
phasizes "a miscarriage of justice," but the California
courts have neutralized this to some extent by emphasis,
and perhaps overemphasis, upon the court's view of
"overwhelming evidence." We prefer the approach of
this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our
recent case of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85. There we
said: "The question is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction." Id., at 86-87 .... [This
statement in Fahy], like the federal harmless-error
statute, . . . emphasizes an intention not to treat as
harmless those constitutional errors that "affect sub-
stantial rights" of a party. An error in admitting plainly
relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely
38 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
9 people v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 197, 404 P.2d 209, 220, 221, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729,
740, 741 (1965).
40 386 U.S. at 26.
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to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as harm-
less.41
Much of this Fahy-Chapman language seems to support the
position that in assessing harmlessness of federal constitutional
error, one should focus on the incriminating quality of the er-
roneously admitted evidence instead of weighing the untainted
evidence in the case.42 The dichotomy the Court creates, in the
above quotation from Chapman, between its Fahy approach of
asking whether "the evidence complained of might have con-
tributed to the conviction" and the California courts' approach
suggests this view. One might, of course, argue that an error
does not "contribute to the conviction" if other overwhelming
evidence compels a verdict of guilty. But the Court, in these
cases, seems to suggest a distinction between asking whether er-
roneously admitted evidence "possibly influenced the jury" (or,
"might have contributed to the verdict") and asking whether,
even if the error might have been influential, other untainted
evidence would in any event have compelled the same result.
This argument interprets Fahy and Chapman as suggesting a rule
that, in assessing harmfulness, one should focus on the errone-
ously introduced evidence alone. That in both cases the state su-
preme court that was reversed had relied on the overwhelming
quality of the evidence against the defendant reinforces this im-
pression.
Yet the holdings of Fahy and Chapman are clearly reconcil-
able with the overwhelming evidence test as a supplemental
means of determining harmless error. For, despite the state
court statements, it seems that in neither case was there over-
whelming evidence of guilt apart from the error. Indeed, in
Fahy, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the finding of over-
whelming evidence that the state supreme court had made, find-
ing that much of that evidence was not independent of the un-
constitutionally admitted evidence but instead derived from it.4
3
And in Chapman, the Court, assessing the harmfulness of the
41 1d. at 23-24 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
4 One opinion adopting this reading of Chapman is Virgin Islands v. Bell, 392 F.2d
207, 209-10 (3d Cir. 1968). See also cases cited in note 30 supra.
43 "Examining the effect of this [illegally obtained] evidence upon the other evi-
dence adduced at trial and upon the conduct of the defense, we find inescapable the
conclusion that the trial court's error was prejudicial and cannot be called harmless."
375 U.S. at 87. The Court's discussion of the other evidence in the case, id. at 88-91,
also supports this reading.
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comments on failure to testify, not only stressed the pervasive-
ness of the comments, but also said:
[T]hough the case in which this occurred presented a
reasonably strong "circumstantial web of evidence"
against petitioners, 63 Cal. 2d, at 197, 404 P.2d, at 220,
it was also a case in which, absent the constitutionally
forbidden comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might
very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts.44
In addition, the Chapman Court, immediately following its lan-
guage suggesting that focusing on the error is the correct ap-
proach to harmless error,45 said: "Certainly error, constitutional
error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or com-
ments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a
burden to show that it was harmless," and harmlessness must be
shown beyond a reasonable doubt.46 This suggests that such a
showing of harmlessness is possible although the error itself is
"highly prejudicial." Another indication that the weight of the
untainted evidence may be a factor in determining harmlessness
is the statement that "[i]n fashioning a harmless-constitutional-
error rule, we must recognize that harmless-error rules can work
very unfair and mischievous results when, for example, highly
important and persuasive evidence, or argument, though legally
forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or
innocence is a close one."'47 One leaves Chapman, then, with the view
that the strength of the untainted evidence is not entirely ir-
relevant to a finding of harmless error, although it should not be
given "overemphasis. 48
In the final analysis, the Court in Chapman does not formu-
late a coherent test for application of the harmless error doc-
trine. It is difficult to see the problem of the overwhelming evi-
dence test as one of overemphasis versus proper emphasis. The
test either is or is not a proper supplement to determining harm-
lessness by focusing on the incriminating qualities of the con-
stitutional error. Chapman both disparages use of this test as a
44 386 U.S. at 25-26.
45 See quotation in text accompanying note 41 supra.
46 386 U.S. at 24.
47 d. at 22-23 (emphasis supplied). See also id. at 22: "We conclude that there may
be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant
and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed
harmless, not requiring the jautomatic reversal of the conviction." (emphasis supplied)
48d. at 23.
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supplement and speaks on the assumption that it is a proper
one.
The Court's opinion in Bumper v. North Carolina similarly
suggests that the exclusive way to assess harmlessness is to focus
on the erroneously admitted evidence. The case involved a con-
viction of felonious assault and rape that the Supreme Court
reversed because the defendant's improperly seized rifle, al-
legedly used in the crime, had been introduced against him at
trial. Justice Black argued in dissent that the error was harmless
because "the overwhelming evidence in this case, even when the
rifle and related testimony are excluded, amply demonstrates
petitioner's guilt. ' 49 The majority opinion's full discussion of the
issue in text, however, states that "it was constitutional error to
admit the rifle in evidence against the petitioner .... Because the
rifle was plainly damaging evidence against the petitioner with
respect to all three of the charges against him, its admission at
the trial was not harmless error."50 That language focuses solely
on the nature of the constitutional error to assess harmlessness.
In a footnote,51 however, the majority responded to Justice
Black's assertion that the strength of the other evidence in the
case rendered the error harmless. First it addressed Justice
Black's "assumption that the petitioner was guilty" by saying that
"it is not the function of this Court to determine innocence or
guilt, much less to apply our own subjective notions of justice."
That statement might suggest a repudiation of the overwhelm-
ing evidence approach, as I will develop below. 52 "In view of
the discursive factual recital contained in the dissenting opin-
ion," however, the majority added that it did not believe that the
untainted evidence against the petitioner was overwhelming.
The footnote therefore makes the majority's position on deter-
mination of harmless error more equivocal than a reading of the
text alone would indicate.
53
11391 U.S. at 558 (dissenting opinion). For further discussion of this opinion, see
note 26 supra.
50 d. at 550.
"Id. at 550 n.16.
52 See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
13 Similarly, Justice Harlan, writing separately, first points out that
the test is not and cannot be simply whether this Court finds credible the evi-
dence against [the petitioner]. Crediting or discrediting evidence is the func-
tion of the trier of fact, in this case ajury. The jury's verdict is a lawful verdict,
however, only if it is based upon evidence constitutionally admissible. When it
is not, as it is not here, reversal rests on the oldest and most fundamental
principle of our criminal jurisprudence-that a defendant is entitled to put the
prosecution to its lawful proof.
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In addition, some Supreme Court statements clearly support
exclusive focus on erroneously admitted evidence as the proper
approach to harmless error, because they support a doctrine of
automatic reversal for some constitutional errors. In Chapman,
for example, the Court recognized that "there are some constitu-
tional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error. '5 4 A footnote cites three cases and
characterizes the rights involved as "coerced confession," "right
to counsel," and "impartial judge. ' 55 At least when those errors
are involved, therefore, the Court has said that the overwhelm-
ing evidence test is inappropriate. What makes it inappropriate
for those errors and not for others?
The errors designated in the footnote are of two types: (1)
those that by their nature are especially damaging to a defen-
dant, such as admission of a coerced confession, and (2) those
that infect the entire trial process, such as the other two.
5 6
391 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., concurring). While that statement might indicate a repudia-
tion of the "overwhelming evidence" approach, see text accompanying notes 61-64 infra,
Justice Harlan goes on to read the two approaches together to constitute one test:
[T]he question cannot be whether, in the view of this Court, the defendant
actually committed the crimes charged, so that the error was "harmless" in the
sense that petitioner got what he deserved. The question is whether the error
was such that it cannot be said that petitioner's guilt was adjudicated on the
basis of constitutionally admissible evidence, which means, in this case, whether the
properly admissible evidence was such that the improper admission of the gun could not
have affected the result.
Id. at 553 (emphasis supplied). Justice Harlan goes on to say that the untainted evi-
dence, though strong enough to serve as the basis for a jury verdict against the
petitioner, was not strong enough to compel that result.
54 386 U.S. at 23 (footnote omitted).
55 Id. at 23 n.8.
"6 Other categories of automatically reversible errors are possible. One such category
is suggested in the discussion in note 19 supra. Another category appropriate for au-
tomatic reversal includes situations in which the prosecution deliberately committed the
constitutional error or intentionally risked committing it. Instances of intentional viola-
tions are knowing use of perjured testimony, Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967), or delib-
erate suppression of evidence favorable to the defense, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968); but cf. Moore v. Illinois,
408 U.S. 786 (1972). The rule of automatic reversal should apply as well, however,
when serious issues as to constitutionality have been raised and debated and the pros-
ecution has nonetheless insisted upon the propriety of introducing the questionable
evidence.
It is true that to the extent that objections must be made at trial to be preserved,
those points that reach appeals courts always will have been raised below. Moreover, the
prosecution implicitly claims that all the evidence it introduces is damaging to the de-
fendant. To some extent, therefore, estoppel runs up against the very notion of harm-
less error rules, at least where the error ociurs in the admission of evidence.
Whether one finds such governmental insistence upon the use of the improper
evidence as would bring the automatic reversal rule into play is therefore a question of
degree. But when an issue is litigated below in more than perfunctory fashion, govern-
mental insistence despite debate as to the propriety of evidence seems inconsistent with
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Acceptance of the first set of errors as automatically revers-
ible is logically inconsistent with the overwhelming evidence test.
It is difficult to perceive why the weight of the untainted evi-
dence should be irrelevant to certain especially prejudicial
categories of constitutional error unless it is irrelevant as well
when a particular, highly prejudicial error has occurred. The
theory of the overwhelming evidence test is that regardless how
prejudicial the constitutional error was, a conviction should not
be reversed if the case against the defendant was so strong that
conviction was inevitable. Acceptance of these errors as automat-
ically reversible is, of course, perfectly consistent with the first
approach to harmless error, looking only to the particular piece
of illegally introduced evidence in assessing harmfulness.
It would, however, be consistent with the overwhelming evi-
dence test to have a rule requiring automatic reversal whenever
the constitutional error was such that by its nature it affected the
entire trial process. If, for example, the defendant was deprived
of his right to representation by an attorney, the weight of the
evidence against him should be irrelevant because representation
presumably would have affected the quality of the case against
him. 57 Alternatively, one could view this situation as an applica-
a later governmental position that the evidence in any event was unnecessary. Unless at
the time of introduction the government deemed the evidence important, it seems un-
likely it would have risked reversal by insisting on its use. Bram v. United States, 168
U.S. 532 (1897); United States v. Blair, 470 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972); People v. Powell,
67 Cal. 2d 32, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967). True, if overwhelming evidence
is the standard by which harmlessness is to be gauged, it may sometimes occur that the
prosecution insists upon introducing evidence that proves unnecessary as the other
evidence in the case develops. Even then estopping the government from asserting
harmlessness does not seem unduly harsh. And if the nature of the error is the sole
test of harmlessness, this category for automatic reversal seems unquestionably sound.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that many of the leading cases concerning
harmless error involve errors that were committed before their unconstitutionality
was established but were later ruled to be retroactive constitutional violations. The
Griffin violation in Chapman v. California, for example, occurred before Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), was decided. Fahy v. Connecticut involved a fourth
amendment violation that occurred before the Supreme Court ruled that the fourth
amendment applied to the states. The Bruton violations in Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250 (1969), and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972), occurred prior to the
Court's decision in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In those cases, there-
fore, a prosecuting attorney could claim unawareness of the unconstitutionality of his
conduct much more successfully than if his violation occurred after the constitutional
rule was announced. But cf. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). The principal
danger in using a harmless error analysis in this situation is that it may be applied so as
effectively to vitiate the Court's retroactivity ruling. Cf. Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87 (1974).
" The Court seems to have adopted this theory in the right-to-counsel area. See
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43 (Stewart, J., concurring). But see Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967).
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tion of the overwhelming evidence test, finding there is no com-
pelling untainted evidence, or indeed any untainted evidence at
all, because all the evidence in the case derives from the constitu-
tional error. Forcing a legally incompetent person to stand trial
is an error comparable in this respect. Trial by a biased tribunal
is arguably of the same dimension. 58
Coerced confessions, however, are clearly inconsistent with
this defining principle for a category of automatically reversible
errors. The only sense in which a coerced confession may be said
to affect the entire trial process is that it may be so incriminating
in the mind of the factfinder that it effectively forecloses the
defense. To allow that rationale to support automatic reversal is
to define that category according to the degree of prejudice
inherent in the particular type of constitutional error-the ex-
planation that is inconsistent with retention of the overwhelm-
ing evidence test.
It may be that, despite the Chapman statement, the Supreme
Court would not in fact automatically reverse for introduction of
a coerced confession without regard to the weight of other evi-
dence in the case.59 Supreme Court holdings-as opposed to Su-
preme Court language-mandating automatic reversal since
5 Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), in which the majority over-
turned a conviction because the state attorney general had issued a search warrant in a
case he was investigating (contrary to the fourth amendment's requirement that the
issuing officer be neutral and detached). The majority did not mention the possibility of
finding harmless error, id. at 450, although Justice Black, in dissent, argued that the
error was harmless, id. at 501-02. Other errors that would be included if infection of
the whole trial process were the defining principle for automatically reversible cases are
violations of double jeopardy, see Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970), and cases
in which the defendant has been convicted on the basis of an unconstitutional statute,
see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). In those situations, no trial and jury
determination of guilt could be made without the constitutional irregularity. But if this
definition of automatically reversible errors were adopted, a difficulty sometimes would
arise in separating those situations in which the whole trial process could be said to be
affected from those in which it could not. In Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975), revg Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.
Tex. 1973), for example, the defendant was tried while wearing jail clothes. Should this
be considered an error affecting the whole trial process or not? (The appeals court
reversed the conviction, finding a due process violation and, contrary to the district
court, a lack of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.)
'9 Indeed, Harrington and Milton may so indicate. In both, confessions were held
harmless. Harrington may be compatible with an automatic reversal rule for confessions
in that it involved use of a codefendant's confession-a sixth amendment violation-that
was held harmless. Milton, however, involved the defendant's confession, possibly ob-
tained in violation of the right to counsel as defined in Massiah.
Milton and Harrington may, however, indicate simply that confessions are not per se
reversible when they are "cumulative" with untainted evidence in the trial, see text ac-
companying notes 69-117 infra, but that it is nonetheless improper to apply an over-
whelming evidence test to coerced confessions.
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the Supreme Court declared harmlessness a federal question
in Chapman are nonexistent. Indeed, the language relied on in
Chapman to support the existence of an automatically-
reversible-error category was simply descriptive of Supreme
Court precedents. It might be explained simply as a relic of the
pre-Chapman view that all federal constitutional errors re-
quire automatic reversal.6 0 In retreating from that position
in Chapman, the Court distinguished prior holdings as com-
pelled by the particularly prejudicial quality of the errors in-
volved rather than squarely overturning the automatic reversal
approach.
It is consistent with the overwhelming evidence test, which
some of the case law supports, either to have no automatically
reversible category or to have one that comports with the infects-
the-entire-trial-process explanation. Retaining a category of
automatically reversible errors not limited to errors that affect
all the evidence, however, would impugn the consistency of the
Supreme Court's approach to harmless error determinations.
In sum, the case law on the content of the harmless error
standard is less than lucid. There is some indication that Su-
preme Court opinions slip back and forth from one suggested
standard to another, without explicit notice of the change,
though the change could produce different results in many
cases. If one is willing to strain to produce consistency, the single
test most likely to emerge from Supreme Court precedents is
one that would allow a finding of harmlessness in either of two
circumstances: if the constitutional error complained of is by its
nature unlikely to affect the result of litigation, or, even if it does
appear influential, if the record shows as well overwhelming un-
tainted evidence of the defendant's guilt. Although this is the
position that most clearly emerges from the case law, it is my
position that it would be preferable to eliminate the overwhelm-
ing evidence test and assess harmlessness solely by evaluating the
impact of the erroneously admitted evidence, without regard to
the weight of the untainted evidence in the case.
IV. SHOULD THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
TEST BE RETAINED?
There are three reasons why the overwhelming evidence
test should not be retained and the courts should confine them-
6 0But see Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
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selves to examining the tainted evidence (in context if necessary)
in order to determine harmlessness:
1. An appellate court using the overwhelming evidence test
usurps the jury's function far more significantly than an
appellate court limiting its inquiry to an examination of the
error.
2. The overwhelming evidence test disparages the notion
that constitutional protection is due all citizens, the guilty as
well as the innocent.
3. Findings of harmlessness under the overwhelming evi-
dence test are much less subject to judicial review than find-
ings of harmlessness under the first approach.
The first of these reasons is by far the most significant.
In one sense, the charge that an appellate court using the
overwhelming evidence test usurps the jury's function could be
leveled against any doctrine of harmless error. Whenever a court
allows a conviction to stand despite an error, on the ground that
the error is harmless, it is saying the jury would have reached the
same result had the error not occurred. 61 The cost and the im-
perfection of retrial as a general means of resolving whether an
error was significant 62 support allowing an appellate court to
61 Instead of determining for itself the effect of error on the jury, a reviewing
court could reverse the decision, thereby allowing a retrial without the error to serve as
a test whether the error was influential; if the error truly was not determinative, the
jury could find the defendant guilty again.
62 Such an approach, which amounts to an overturning of the harmless error doc-
trine, would be expensive indeed if the rule were literally to allow a criminal conviction
to stand only if the trial were wholly error-free. Criminal litigation, moreover, might be
interminable. Even if the retrial avoided the original error, it probably would contain
some error that, by hypothesis, would also necessitate reversal. In Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the Court said that harmless error statutes, federal and
state, resulted from a situation in which
courts of review "tower above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable
citadels of technicality." So great was the threat of reversal, in many jurisdic-
tions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible error in the rec-
ord, only to have repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had
been thus obtained.
Id. at 759 (footnote omitted). (Federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction, as currently
interpreted, has been criticized for its interference with the finality of convictions. E.g.,
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L.
REv. 441 (1963). While habeas results in continual reopening of final convictions, the
effect of a rule that no error can be harmless would go further and prevent convictions
from becoming final in the first instance.)
A rule of automatic reversal might, however, be reserved for errors of constitu-
tional dimension, preserving the harmless error doctrine "to prevent matters concerned
with the mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae of procedure
from touching the merits of a verdict," Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294
(1939), as the doctrine was intended to do. Indeed, until Fahy in 1963, Supreme Court
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rule in some cases that an error so clearly did not affect the ver-
dict that retrial is unnecessary. If, however, in making this de-
termination the court limits itself to the first approach, it usurps
the jury's function far less significantly than if it decides harm-
lessness by assessing the weight of the untainted evidence. For
the court's function under the first approach is limited to exam-
ining the error to determine whether, beyond a reasonable
doubt, it was irrelevant to a finding of guilt, so that the review-
ing court can be certain that the jury did not in fact give weight
to it. Under the second approach, by contrast, the erroneously
admitted evidence may have been very relevant indeed to the
factfinder 63 but the error may still be declared harmless on the
ground that other overwhelming evidence supports the verdict.
The crucial difference between the appellate reviews under
the tests is that a court that makes a finding of harmlessness
under the overwhelming evidence test is not finding that the
erroneously admitted evidence did not in fact affect the verdict.
It may have been the erroneously admitted evidence and not the
untainted evidence that persuaded the jury of the defendant's
guilt, and yet the conviction may be allowed to stand. The court's
affirmance simply indicates its opinion that the untainted evi-
dence is so overwhelming that if the jury had been compelled to
rely on it alone, it would have convicted. In so holding, the court
opinions lent support to the view that harmless error would not apply to constitutional
errors. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42-45 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897);
Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 VILL
L. REV. 48, 67 (1957); 47 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 461 (1947); Note, Harmless Constitutional
Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967); see Kotteakos v. United States, supra at 764-65. But see
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). Perhaps that would be the wisest disposi-
tion of the harmless error issue; the Court, however, definitively rejected it in Chapman.
Even disregarding the expense, automatic retrial for constitutional error has its
own problems. The retrial does not provide a precise experimental test of how the jury
would have decided the case had the constitutional error not occurred. When the un-
tainted evidence, though sufficient to support a finding of guilt, is less than overwhelm-
ing, a change in verdict might result from a change in composition of the jury on
retrial rather than from the error's absence. But insofar as the new verdict is based on
the same evidence as at the first trial and represents a fair determination that the de-
fendant is not guilty, the change in result is no cause for concern though a verdict of
guilty would have been sustainable. Similarly, a change in verdict may result from the
defense learning from strategic errors committed the first time around, or from a
change in strategy by the defense in light of its increased knowledge of the
prosecution's case. The most worrisome reason for a change in verdict at the retrial,
however, is a disappearance of witnesses or of other evidence important to the
prosecution's case. Because either side's evidence may not be available at a second trial,
a retrial may differ significantly from the model of the original trial absent the constitu-
tional error.
" As it was in both Bumper and Milton.
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is not passing upon what the jury did; it is not determining the
propriety of the evidence on which the jury relied. Because it is
ruling instead upon what the jury would do if forced to rely on
different evidence, it is substituting itself for the jury as fact-
finder. Such a practice is difficult to reconcile with the ac-
cepted rule that a trial judge may not direct a verdict against a
defendant in a criminal case, regardless of the strength of the
evidence against him.
64
The first approach is significantly less vulnerable in this re-
spect. Under the first approach, the court rules that the nature
of the erroneously admitted evidence is such that it could not
have affected the jury, so the jury must have relied on other
(sufficient if not overwhelming) evidence in the first instance, the
same evidence it would rely on again were there a retrial. It rules that a
remand would result in a conviction of defendant on the same
evidence on which he has already been convicted. This is unlike
the overwhelming evidence test, under which the court denies
that the error affected the verdict, but only because of its view of
what the jury would do in an essentially different situation than
the one that was presented to it.
The practice is also inconsistent with the notion that all ac-
cused individuals, both guilty and innocent, are entitled to a fair
trial and to all the protections of the Constitution. Its effect is
that a trial in which a damaging constitutional error was made is
acceptable for an individual who is undoubtably guilty-that is,
against whom there is overwhelming evidence. By contrast,
under the first approach, a reviewing court must always examine
whether the trial was an essentially fair one, in which the convic-
tion was not based upon any constitutional error that did occur.
There is another, more pragmatic, reason for favoring the
first approach without the overwhelming evidence test: the
greater ease of review which the first approach affords. It thus
64 If the sixth amendment requires that rule, it would seem to preclude an over-
whelming evidence test for errors of constitutional dimension as well.
One reason for requiring that a jury pass on the case may be so that it can exercise
mercy, regardless of the weight of the evidence, if it so chooses. But even if that ex-
plains the directed verdict rule, admitting illegally obtained evidence may determina-
tively affect a jury's decision whether to render clemency. Accordingly, the directed
verdict analogy still obtains. There is, of course, a distinction between prohibiting di-
rected verdicts and prohibiting harmless error rulings: directed verdicts are quite un-
necessary in ordinary circumstances because the judge can simply allow the case to go
to the jury, which is convened and presumably able to render a verdict. Prohibiting
harmless error rulings would be far more expensive, in that a new trial would have to
be ordered.
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makes appellate review a more effective check on misuse of the
harmless error doctrine.
In the past, state and lower federal courts have sometimes
used the harmless error doctrine to evade full compliance with
constitutional requirements, 65 acknowledging constitutional rules
in theory, but calling infractions harmless at particular trials in
circumstances where such rulings were questionable. If over-
whelming untainted evidence is a test of harmlessness, Supreme
Court or other appellate review of such rulings is very difficult.
Few cases will be reviewed in full, and the holdings in those will
lack precedential import, for the overwhelming evidence test is
based on all the evidence in the record except the erroneously
admitted evidence. Under the overwhelming evidence test, ple-
nary review of a harmless error ruling entails a commitment to
examine in detail what may be a very complicated and extensive
record 66 in order to weigh the evidence, only to render a deci-
sion devoid of precedential value because so closely tied to the
facts of the case.67 Under the first approach, it would be more
difficult for recalcitrant courts to avoid constitutional rules by
paying them lip service and then calling infractions harmless.68
6 5 See generally Brief for Respondent at 25, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967); R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 43 (1970); Cameron & Osborn,
When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless, 1971 LAW & THE SOCIAL ORDER 23 (written by a
Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court); Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amendment,
16 STAN. L. REV. 318 (1964); Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of
Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1969); Thompson, Unconstitutional Search
and Seizure and the Myth of Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 457 (1967) (written by
the Chief Justice of the Nevada Supreme Court); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20
STAN. L. REV. 83, 86 (1967). Examples of cases that seemingly evidence this tendency
are United States v. Jackson, 429 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (7th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v.
Wilbur, 353 Mass. 376, 231 N.E.2d 919 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1010 (1968); State
v. Hudson, 281 N.C. 100, 187 S.E.2d 756 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1160 (1974).
66 Consider, for example, the boast of the court of appeals in United States v. Fass-
ler, 434 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1011 (1971), that it had carefully
studied the entire 564-page transcript in order to establish a defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Or consider Harrington, in which a 427-page record confronted the
Justices.
6 7 Justice Brennan made this point in his dissent in Harrington: "By its nature, the
issue of substantiality of evidence admits of only the most limited kind of appellate
review. Thus, the Court's rule will often effectively leave the vindication of constitu-
tional rights solely in the hands of trial judges." 395 U.S. at 256.
68 The ease of review under the first approach does change, of course, according to
how the error is viewed. If the error is such that the court can rule on its harmlessness
apart from the facts of the case, it can look only to the disputed evidence to decide
whether.it is of a nature likely to be influential with a jury and thereby avoid working
through the record altogether. When, however, the inquiry must be whether the chal-
lenged evidence is damaging in context, because of its interaction with untainted evi-
dence in the case, the scope of the inquiry most closely approximates that required by
the overwhelming evidence test. But even here the focus of review is substantially nar-
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V. THE CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE TEST-A
THIRD DISTINCT APPROACH
Another general test for harmless constitutional error that is
discernible from the cases focuses on whether the tainted evi-
dence was "merely cumulative"--that is, whether untainted evi-
dence that says the same thing as the excluded evidence remains
in the case. The theory is that the tainted evidence added
nothing material to the government's case, and the error is
therefore harmless. The principal problems with the test are
ones of definition.
A. Harrington v. California
Harrington v. California69 is the chief case supporting the
existence of a cumulative evidence test. In Harrington, the Su-
preme Court held harmless the introduction of confessions of
two codefendants who did not take the stand at petitioner's trial
for felony murder and attempted robbery. The use of those
confessions was constitutional error under Bruton v. United
States.70 The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, held
that the evidence the unconstitutional confessions provided was
cumulative both with a statement of Harrington placing himself
at the scene of the crime and a confession of a third codefendant
that did not violate Bruton. The Court also said:
[A]part from [the erroneously admitted confes-
sions] the case against Harrington was so overwhelming
that we conclude that this violation of Bruton was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt, unless we adopt the
minority view in Chapman . . . that a departure from
rower and the process correspondingly easier than under the overwhelming evidence
test. For the defendant, in putting forth a case for the damaging effects of the evidence
in context, will point to the particular aspects of the untainted evidence relevant to his
argument; the entire record will not be relevant, but only those portions containing
evidence alleged to interact in a damaging manner with the illegal evidence, and the
parties can be counted on to bring forth that evidence in argument. If the prosecution
disputes the defendant's analysis, it should offer an explanation why the interaction was
not harmful, and perhaps point to other evidence making it harmless. But as long as
neither the prosecution nor a lower court can rely on the overwhelming weight of the
untainted evidence taken as a whole, the reviewing court need look only to particular
parts of the record pointed out to it, and then only to trace the effects of the particular
illegal evidence on the verdict; it need not peruse and weigh the evidence in the record
as a whole. Review is substantially more limited than under the overwhelming evidence
test, although this approach may produce some holdings limited to the facts of a par-
ticular case.
69 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
70 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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constitutional procedures should result in an automatic
reversal, regardless of the weight of the evidence."'
The opinion went on to say:
We admonished in Chapman . .. against giving too
much emphasis to "overwhelming evidence" of guilt,
stating that constitutional errors affecting the substan-
tial rights of the aggrieved party could not be consid-
ered to be harmless. By that test we cannot impute re-
versible weight to the two confessions.
We do not depart from Chapman; nor do we dilute
it by inference. We reaffirm it. We do not suggest that,
if evidence bearing on all the ingredients of the crime is
tendered, the use of cumulative evidence, though
tainted, is harmless error. Our decision is based on the
evidence in this record. The case against Harrington
was not woven from circumstantial evidence. It is so
overwhelming that unless we say that no violation of
Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must leave this
state conviction undisturbed. 72
The overwhelming untainted evidence against Harrington to
which the Court referred consisted in part of a statement by
Harrington. The statement, which was not a confession, placed
Harrington at the scene of the crime and contained an admission
that he fled with the other three. In it, Harrington also admitted
that after the murder he shaved off his moustache and dyed his
hair. The testifying codefendant's confession placed Harrington
inside the store with a gun, and the testimony of eyewitnesses
placed Harrington at the scene. The erroneously admitted con-
fessions did not mention Harrington by name but described him
and placed him at the scene of the crime. (In the Court's state-
ment of facts, it is unclear to what extent either the eyewitnesses
or the nontestifying codefendants described Harrington as an
active participant in the crime instead of simply confirming his
admission that he was present. 73)
It is difficult to state with any certainty exactly what test for
harmless error the Harrington opinion adopts. Although it says
11 395 U.S. at 254 (citations omitted).
72 d. (citations omitted).
13 For a somewhat different version of the facts, see note 87 infra.
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that the overwhelming evidence test should not be given "too
much emphasis,' 74 much of the opinion reads as if the reason
for the finding of harmlessness is the overwhelming nature of
the untainted evidence against Harrington. Indeed, the opinion
twice (at the end of each of the above quotations) speaks as if the
only alternatives for determining harmlessness are an over-
whelming evidence test, on the one hand, and a rule of auto-
matic reversal on the other. In other ways, though, the opinion
suggests there may be something about the way the tainted evi-
dence relates to the untainted evidence that is pertinent to the
finding of harmlessness, 7 5 not simply the quantity or weight of
the untainted evidence. This suggests a third variant by which
harmless error might be determined, a variant I will refer to as
the cumulative evidence test.
B. Distinguishing Cumulative Evidence
from the Other Tests
Whether or not a cumulative evidence test explains the re-
sult in Harrington, this test does represent a distinct approach to
harmless error. That there is a difference between this test and
the first approach is clear. Applying the first approach to the
facts of Harrington, one could not find harmlessness; examining
the nontestifying codefendants' confessions, one would con-
clude that they incriminated Harrington. 6 The cumulative evi-
dence test, on the other hand, is like the overwhelming evidence
test in that it allows a finding of harmlessness despite the conclu-
74 Id. But cf. text accompanying notes 48-49 supra, criticizing the Court for making
the same point in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
75 395 U.S. at 253-54.
76 The Court itself appeared to reach this conclusion in Harrington. The argument
apparently was made that the confessions were not damaging to Harrington because
they did not refer to him by name. In one he was called "the white boy" and "this white
guy" and described by age, height, and weight. In the other he was called a blond-
headed fellow, "the white guy," and "the Patty." In its opinion, the Court said:
Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that he was not named in Cooper's
and Bosby's confessions, that reference to "the white guy" made it as clear as
pointing and shouting that the person referred to was the white man in the
dock with the three Negroes. We make the same assumption.
395 U.S. at 253. The Court went on nevertheless to hold the error harmless under the
overwhelming evidence test and/or the cumulative evidence test.
Indeed, a statement by participants that a Caucasian was an accomplice could itself
have been detrimental to Harrington, for one point in his favor was that two of the
eyewitnesses who identified him as a participant had previously told the police that all
four participants were Black. Id.
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sion that the error itself is prima facie incriminating, as long as it
is somehow cumulative with other untainted evidence in the
case. The interrelation between the first approach and the
cumulative evidence test can thus be summarized as follows: the
cumulative evidence test (again, like the overwhelming evidence
test) is relevant only to errors that would not be harmless under
the first approach. Any error that is harmless under the first
approach will necessarily be found harmless. The cumulative
evidence test and the overwhelming evidence test provide means
of holding harmless some errors that would appear harmful
under the first approach alone.
The cumulative evidence test differs also from the over-
whelming evidence test, as the following example illustrates.
Suppose a defendant in a criminal case has on five occasions
made identical statements to the police. The first four were vol-
unteered and spontaneous. The police solicited the fifth under
circumstances requiring Miranda warnings, which were not
given. All five statements are introduced at trial, the fifth uncon-
stitutionally. None of the statements admits guilt; they all deny
it. But each is incriminating because it places the defendant at
the scene of the crime and thereby provides a necessary link in
the chain of evidence against him. The cumulative evidence test
clearly would deem harmless the error in admitting the fifth
statement, because by hypothesis it is identical in content to the
four previously obtained, untainted statements. The overwhelm-
ing evidence test, standing alone, would allow a finding of harm-
lessness only if the untainted evidence was compelling, as op-
posed to simply sufficient to support the jury's verdict. That
might or might not be true in the hypothetical above. Of course,
a court could follow both the overwhelming evidence test and the
cumulative evidence test, allowing a finding of harmlessness if
either approach were satisfied; the point is simply that the tests
can be applied separately and can lead to different results. Simi-
larly, one can hypothesize a case in which the overwhelming
evidence test leads to a conclusion of harmlessness, but no un-
tainted evidence is strictly "cumulative" with the tainted evi-
dence, so that if that test stood alone, a finding of harmlessness
would not be possible. The interrelation of the overwhelming
evidence test and the cumulative evidence test depends, how-
ever, upon how the requirement of "cumulativeness" is viewed,
as I will now discuss.
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C. Requirements of the Cumulative Evidence Test
1. Cumulativeness Defined-The Case
for a Narrow Standard
One can apply the cumulative evidence test in such a way
that it slips into the overwhelming evidence test. Take, for ex-
ample, a case in which a codefendant's confession, erroneously
admitted in violation of Bruton, implicates the complaining de-
fendant in a theft of merchandise from a warehouse. Yet also in
evidence, and undisputed, are police photographs of the rob-
bers, taken during commission of the crime, which clearly attest
to the defendant's guilt.7 7 In such a case one might say that the
Bruton violation was "cumulative" in that it simply offered evi-
dence of a proposition that was clear: the defendant's guilt.
Viewed in this way, the cumulative evidence test is satisfied by a
finding of overwhelming evidence: two pieces of evidence, both
damaging to the defendant on the ultimate issue-guilt-are
thereby deemed "cumulative" or "merely corroborative" of each
other.
78
The requirement of cumulativeness can, however, be de-
fined more narrowly so that the test is distinct from one requir-
ing overwhelming evidence. So defined, the tests are wholly
independent of each other in the sense that either may, in par-
ticular situations, be more generous to a finding of harmless-
ness than is the other. Not only can the cumulative evidence
test be satisfied when the overwhelming evidence test is not (as
the example above involving five consecutive confessions illus-
trates), but also the overwhelming evidence test can be satis-
fied when the cumulative evidence test is not (as the
Bruton-violation-police-photos case illustrates, at least if confes-
sions and photographs cannot be cumulative with each other).
The cumulative evidence test can vary tremendously accord-
ing to how its terms are defined. One might say that the test
whether two pieces of evidence are cumulative is simply whether
77 This example is based on Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
78 The tests still would be equivalent only in the sense that a finding of overwhelm-
ing evidence would satisfy the cumulativeness test, and not vice versa. That is, there
would still be instances of cumulativeness where the untainted evidence was not over-
whelming, as in the hypothetical discussed in the text. So defined, therefore, the cu-
mulativeness test sometimes would be more generous in allowing findings of harmless-
ness than would the overwhelming evidence test, and it would never be stricter.
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they impose the same harm on the defendant. Even then the test
would vary tremendously according to whether the "harm"
could refer to an ultimate fact like "guilt" or whether the specific
facts disclosed in the two pieces of evidence must also be the
same. And, if the latter, it would still have to be resolved how
specific the facts disclosed must be or, phrased differently, how
identical in incriminating content the two pieces of evidence
claimed to be cumulative must be.
Instead of requiring only that evidence, to be cumulative,
must cause the same harm (however defined), one might require
as well that it be of the same kind. Again, marked variations on
what is meant by the "same kind" are possible. One might mean
simply that the fruits of a search could not be cumulative with a
confession, 79 but that confessions could be cumulative with each
other. Or one might require that, to be "of the same kind,"
confessions must as well be made by the same person.80 Or one
might add as well that the confessions must be made under the
same circumstances, or that they must be very similar in word-
ing, and so on, ad infinitum. The simple statement, then, that
error will be considered harmless if it is "merely cumulative" of
untainted evidence in the record (and the cases do not state even
this in certain terms) tells us little indeed about the bases for a
determination of harmlessness.
One can minimize some of the dangers of a cumulative evi-
dence test by -adopting one of the narrower definitions of
"cumulativeness." Before finding that tainted evidence is merely
cumulative with untainted evidence, one could require that the
untainted evidence harm the defendant in the same way, and
also that it be of the same kind; and one can define those terms
as well narrowly: confessions, for example, can be cumulative
only with other confessions and one can require as well that they
be identical in the facts they directly reveal and not just in facts
that may be derived from them.
The danger in finding less similar sources of evidence to be
cumulative is that, in fact, they may have a markedly different
impact on the jury.8' An objection can be made to the cumula-
9 This would mean also that photos and Bruton violations could not be cumulative
with each other, thereby disposing of the cumulativeness argument in the example in
the text. Text accompanying note 76 supra.
80 This rule would never allow Bruton errors to be cumulative with confessions ob-
tamined in violation of the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.
8 Consider, for example, the different effect of various types of evidence in People
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tive evidence test similar to that leveled against the overwhelm-
ing evidence test: in apparent contradiction to precedents disal-
lowing directed verdicts in criminal cases, the overwhelming evi-
dence test allows a finding of harmlessness because of a feeling
that a different jury, possibly acting on different evidence than
the original convicting jury acted on, would necessarily find the
defendant guilty. A court following a broad version of the
cumulative evidence test might similarly displace the jury. The
objection is much less potent, however, if one requires, in a find-
ing of cumulativeness, that the untainted evidence and the
cumulative tainted evidence be very much alike. In that circum-
stance, while admitting that the tainted evidence may have per-
suaded the jury of guilt, a court applying the cumulative evi-
dence test could argue nevertheless that the evidence the jury
otherwise would have heard is so very like the evidence it actually
heard that it clearly would have acted in the same way had no
constitutional error occurred. (Note that one cannot say here
that the next jury necessarily would convict. In this sense, the test
is less stringent in reversing for constitutional error than the
overwhelming evidence test. For the case against the defendant
may, under the cumulative evidence test, be simply sufficient to
support a verdict of guilty and not constitute an overwhelming
case of guilt. What is true under the cumulative evidence test,
but not necessarily under the overwhelming evidence test, is that
the jury that has convicted passed on essentially the same evi-
dence as it would have if no constitutional error had occurred.
82
In this respect, the cumulative evidence test is much closer to the
first approach than is the overwhelming evidence test.)
v. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965). Although several
witnesses at the penalty hearing testified that the defendant had no remorse after slay-
ing his baby, that evidence may have had significantly less impact than the tapes of the
defendant's own voice showing no remorse.
I2 A case of successive incriminating statements by the defendant, one of which
should not have been admitted under Miranda, illustrates the differences among the
three approaches. The first approach would require reversal because the unconstitu-
tionally obtained and admitted statement is itself inCriminating and might, rather than
the others, have persuaded members of the jury of guilt. Under the cumulative evi-
dence approach, by contrast, one might say that regardless of which confession or con-
fessions actually were persuasive, all are so similar that the case would be substantially
unaffected by exclusion of the tainted statement. The overwhelming evidence test
would find harmlessness only if the untainted evidence compelled a conclusion of guilt,
and would allow the court to look at evidence quite unlike the tainted evidence and
independent of it to make this finding.
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2. Probativeness of the Untainted Evidence-The Case
for Requiring Indisputability
Requiring a greater degree of similarity for evidence to
qualify as cumulative not only decreases the likelihood that the
two pieces of evidence would have a different impact on the jury
but also makes it more likely that they are of equal probative
effect. It of course would be senseless to hold harmless the ad-
mission of tainted evidence because it is very similar to properly
admitted evidence, when the improper evidence is the more
probative. Relative probativeness is not, however, always easy to
judge. The only way one can be certain that the two pieces of
evidence are equally probative on every fact is if they are iden-
tical in wording, circumstances under which they were given,
confessor, and so on. How close one should come to requiring
that they be identical is the problem. Rather than purporting to
draft a test that would resolve this issue in terms of the degree of
equivalence in any given case, one can simply require, separate
from the requirements of similarity between the tainted and un-
tainted evidence, that the untainted evidence must be of equal
or superior probative effect or, in other words, that the un-
tainted evidence must be equally or more incriminating than
the tainted evidence. Alternatively, one can phrase the test as
requiring a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding that the fact-
finder could not have believed the tainted evidence without
believing the untainted evidence.
One could instead require, more strictly, that the cumula-
tive, untainted evidence be indisputable (or, phrased differently,
that the factfinder must necessarily have believed the untainted
evidence). There are several advantages to adopting this stricter
view. Before exploring them, however, we should examine some
cases in which harmlessness has been an issue, to see how this
requirement would operate.
The findings of harmlessness in Motes v. United States83 and
in Harrington v. California84 are consistent with this strict test. In
Motes, the petitioner, Columbus Motes, had been tried together
with four codefendants for conspiracy to injure a person in the
exercise of his federal constitutional rights, namely to murder
one Thompson. A sixth coconspirator was originally indicted,
but testified at the preliminary hearing concerning the guilt of
83 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
84 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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all of them and subsequently pleaded guilty. He fled before the
trial, where he was to be a witness, and his preliminary hearing
testimony was introduced against the five defendants. Motes,
testifying at trial, claimed that he and the absentee witness had
committed the murder alone and that none of the other four
defendants had participated at all. The Supreme Court held that
the admission of the absentee conspirator's statement violated
the confrontation clause, but that the violation was harmless as to
Motes because he had offered conclusive proof of his own guilt.
If Motes' admission had been independent of the tainted
evidence, 85 and if Motes in no way controverted it, it would seem
proper to hold the constitutional error harmless as to him be-
cause the facts to which the tainted evidence related would ap-
pear indisputable. The Supreme Court held the error harmless
on this theory, without adverting to the issue whether Motes'
testimony derived from the tainted evidence.8 6 Similarly, in
Harrington v. California, the unconstitutionally admitted evidence
(again, a violation of the confrontation clause) simply duplicated,
in the Court's view,87 Harrington's own admission, which the
defense did not otherwise dispute. The issue to which the er-
roneously admitted evidence related-Harrington's presence at
the scene of the crime-was thus effectively withdrawn from the
case.
85 The Court's opinion does not make clear the temporal sequence between the
constitutional error and the in-court admission. For discussion of the fruits problem
generally, see notes 105-09 infra & accompanying text.
86 Similarly, in Vasquez v. State, 254 Ind. 472, 260 N.E.2d 779 (1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1012 (1971), and in Greer v. State, 252 Ind. 20, 245 N.E.2d 158 (1969), the
Indiana Supreme Court found Miranda violations harmless because in each case the
defendant reiterated the incriminating facts on the witness stand. Again, assuming no
fruits problem, the holding seems correct on the theory that the defendants' admissions
effectively removed from dispute the matters to which the tainted evidence related. (In
fact in Vasquez, a rape prosecution, there appears to be another problem: a discrepancy
in fact between the untainted and the "cumulative" tainted testimony. In the latter, the
defendant claimed to have left a bar 2Y2 hours earlier than in the former. The court
does not explain how this relates to the charge, nor indeed does it disclose when the
rape occurred. The discrepancy between the two pieces of evidence should prevent the
case from qualifying for cumulative evidence treatment. For a discussion concerning
necessity of similarity between the tainted and untainted evidence, see text accompany-
ing notes 79-82 supra.
87 This Article's discussions of the Harrington facts reflect the majority's version of
the case. They see the factual issue to which the tainted evidence addressed itself as
whether Harrington was present at the scene of the crime. See 395 U.S. at 252-53.
Justice Brennan sees the central factual issue, however, as whether Harrington
participated in the crime of attempted robbery, not whether he was present at the scene
of the crime. Id. at 256. The illegally admitted confessions implicated Harrington in
actual participation in the crime, while Harrington's admission went only to his pres-
ence at the scene. Under this view, the illegally admitted evidence was clearly not
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In both cases the untainted evidence, which the tainted evi-
dence duplicated, was effectively indisputable. To require for a
finding of cumulativeness that the "incriminating" facts to which
the tainted evidence attests must be effectively beyond dispute
seems to impose an extremely harsh limitation on the cumulative
evidence test- It would mean that the cumulative evidence test
would limit harmlessness to situations in which the unconstitu-
tionally admitted evidence in retrospect was wholly unnecessary
to the case, just as the first approach limits harmlessness to situa-
tions in which the erroneously admitted evidence was irrelevant
or of trivial consequence.
Yet the condition that the cumulative untainted evidence be
effectively not in dispute is not infrequently satisfied in cases,
and there is reason to require it. For if doubt is raised as to the
validity of the untainted version of the facts, one cannot be cer-
tain whether the jury believed that version or not. When the
tainted evidence is cumulative of evidence the jury disbelieved
(or, alternatively, evidence it would not have believed but for
the reinforcing effect of the tainted evidence), the tainted in-
criminating evidence was obviously important to the disposition
of the case. Let us imagine, for example, a case in which the
prosecution has introduced into evidence two confessions by the
cumulative in content with the untainted evidence. Justice Brennan's view is borne out
by examination of the record in the case. Harrington admitted (in a statement to the
police) that he drove to the store with his codefendants, remained in the car for a
while, and then decided he needed some cigarettes. He did not admit any intent or
desire to participate in a crime. Upon entering the store, he found himself in the midst
of an ongoing robbery. Record at 363. One of the illegally admitted confessions, by
contrast, referred to Harrington as one of "the other two fellows... involved in this," id.
279 (emphasis supplied), and said Harrington went into the store with the two other
codefendants to make sure everything was all right, while the fourth robbed the till.
Record at 276-77, 290. The other placed Harrington at the scene in a manner that
suggested he participated in the robbery. See id. 204-05, 259. It is true that another
codefendant's confession, legally admitted, implicated Harrington by placing him in the
store with a gun while the crime was committed. But as Justice Brennan pointed out,
that codefendant's testimony was largely self-serving and might for that reason have
been discredited: the gun was found in his possession after the robbery, and he testified
that he obtained it from Harrington, who had it during the robbery. The remaining
untainted evidence against Harrington, the testimony of two victims of the crime, was
weakened because the victims had earlier told the police that all the participants in the
crime were Black, whereas Harrington was Caucasian. Moreover, it is not clear whether
they only placed him at the scene or testified concerning his participation as well. In
short, the untainted evidence in the case appears to satisfy neither the overwhelming
evidence test nor the cumulative evidence test. On Justice Brennan's version of the
facts, it is easy to conclude with him that the illegally admitted confessions "might well
have tipped the balance in the jurors' minds in favor of conviction. Certainly, the State
has not carried the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that these two
confessions did not contribute to Harrington's conviction." 395 U.S. at 257.
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defendant. The appellate court holds that it was error under
Miranda to introduce the second confession, but it upholds ad-
mission of the first confession, which the defense had argued
was involuntary because extracted by physical force. The defense
made the same argument to the jury in order to show the unre-
liability of the first confession. In that circumstance, the second
confession should not be declared harmless because duplicative
of the first, for the jury may not have credited the first confes-
sion at all, or they may have decided to credit it only because the
erroneously admitted confession duplicated it.
The discussion thus far suggests that the cumulative evi-
dence test should not be satisfied if the reliability of the un-
tainted duplicative evidence is drawn into question by the de-
fense. Yet the suggested requirement for the cumulative
evidence test goes further by requiring that the untainted evi-
dence, even if the defense says nothing concerning it, must be
indisputable. The reason lies in the constitutional right of the
accused to require the state to prove him guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and in his constitutional right not to take the
stand. A test allowing incriminating error to be harmless be-
cause the defendant had not affirmatively contested it would im-
pinge upon these rights. Thus, if the state presents a case that
depends in part upon facts derived from a constitutional er-
ror, the defendant's inability or unwillingness to contradict
those facts cannot be the basis for a finding of harmlessness. A
finding of harmlessness should be possible only if there is an af-
firmative indication in the record (provided by the petitioners'
own statements in Motes and Harrington) that the defendant ac-
cepts the facts the erroneously admitted evidence supports; or
if the untainted evidence is otherwise indisputable; 88 or if
the facts in question are demonstrably irrelevant to the issue
of guilt or innocence and therefore harmless under the first ap-
proach as well as the cumulative evidence approach.
88 Another twist to a rule requiring that the untainted evidence be indisputable, not
simply undisputed, is shown in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). There the
petitioners did dispute the admissibility of evidence seized in- a search. The United
States Supreme Court, however, held the evidence constitutionally admissible and also
held that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge it. Because the Supreme Court
ruled in the very case that the untainted evidence was admissible, and because the
challenge to the evidence did not call into question its reliability, the propriety of the
evidence should be viewed as indisputable even though the petitioners actually disputed
it. In this connection, however, unlike those instances discussed in the text, a rule of
indisputability is more favorable to the prosecution than a rule looking simply to
whether the defendants have in fact challenged the evidence.
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A number of decisions illustrate the difference between a
rule requiring that the untainted evidence be indisputable con-
cerning the cumulative facts and rules requiring something less.
Brown v. United States,89 for example, seems consistent with the
stricter view. In that case the Supreme Court held harmless the
unconstitutional admission of the codefendants' confessions (vio-
lative, again, of Bruton) because the untainted evidence included
the defendants' own confessions, admitted without objection. 90
Similarly, in United States v. Spinks,9' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to reverse a conviction
where confessions of both the defendant and his codefendant
were introduced in evidence; the codefendant did not take the
stand; and there were "no substantial factual differences" 92 be-
tween the confessions. The complaining defendant did not con-
test his own confession.
9 3
This application of the harmless error doctrine, however, is
valid only if the defendant challenges neither the voluntariness
nor the accuracy of his confession. If he challenges either, his
own confession may still be superior to the tainted one in proba-
tive effect, in the sense that an appellate court might find the
defendant's confession more believable than the codefendant's,
but the jury might have disbelieved the untainted evidence, and
might therefore have given some weight to the tainted evidence
in convicting. It is this point that is ignored in other decisions.
In Schneble v. Florida,94 for example, the Bruton violation
involved a codefendant's confession partially implicating Schne-
ble in a murder. Schneble's own confession also was introduced
at trial. He did not offer evidence to contradict his confession's
details nor did he take the stand. But the evidence did show that
Schneble had denied his guilt to the police before making his
8 9
/d.
90 The majority spoke of the tainted evidence as cumulative of only "largely uncon-
troverted" evidence. Id. at 224, 231. An examination of the record reveals, however,
that the defense did not challenge the accuracy of either confession; the defense rested
its case on the insufficiency of evidence to establish that the goods the defendants had
conspired to transport were worth more than $5000, as the federal statute under which
they were charged required. Record at 152, 154. Moreover, the Court in Brown rested
its decision on overwhelming evidence as well as cumulative evidence.
91 470 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
92 Id. at 65.
" The court implied that Bruton might not be violated when the complaining
defendant's uncontested confession was extremely similar to the complained of admis-
sion. But cf. id. at 65; text accompanying notes 104-06 infra. It then said that "if error
was committed it was harmless" in this case. 470 F.2d at 66.
94 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
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confession, and that he confessed only after the police engaged
in coercive tactics. (The Florida Supreme Court had held the
improper police tactics sufficiently remote from the statements
to dissipate the taint.) The trial judge had initially found
Schneble's confession voluntary but then had left the issue to the
jury, together with the other issues in the case, instructing them
to disregard Scheble's confession if they found it involuntary.
Although Schneble's confession was thus disputed, the Su-
preme Court, per Rehnquist, J., considered it as part of the
untainted evidence of which the codefendant's statement was
merely corroborative. 95 The basis of this approach was the
Court's own finding that the facts related in Schneble's confes-
sion were accurate because they were "minutely detailed,' 96 "in-
ternally consistent, were corroborated by other objective evi-
dence, and were not contradicted by any other evidence in the
case. They were consistently reiterated by petitioner on several
occasions after his first exposition of them.
97
The Supreme Court had limited its grant of certiorari so as
not to review the voluntariness issue as such. It found, however,
that the jury must have found Schneble's confession voluntary,
because if it had not, there would not have been sufficient evi-
dence to convict. 98 By thus saying that the jury necessarily found
Schneble's confession entirely reliable, the Supreme Court raised
the confession to the status of indisputable evidence, although it
was in fact vigorously disputed. The Court went on to say:
Charged as they were by the judge that they must be
"satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt" and "to a moral
certainty" of Schneble's guilt before they could convict
him, the jurors could on no rational hypothesis have
found Schneble guilty without reliance on his confes-
sion. Judicious application of the harmless-error rule
does not require that we indulge assumptions of irra-
tional jury behavior when a perfectly rational explana-
tion for the jury's verdict, completely consistent with the
judge's instructions, stares us in the face. See Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 504-505 (1957).
Having concluded that petitioner's confession was
considered by the jury, we must determine on the basis
95 Id. at 431.
96 405 U.S. at 430.
97 Id. at 431.
9 8 But cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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of "our own reading of the record and on what seems to
us to have been the probable impact.., on the minds of
an average jury," Harrington v. California, supra, at 254,
whether [the codefendant's] . . . admissions were suffi-
ciently prejudicial to petitioner as to require reversal.
• . . [U]nless there is a reasonable possibility that the
improperly admitted evidence contributed to the con-
viction, reversal is not required. See Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In this case, we con-
clude that the "minds of an average jury" would not
have found the State's case significantly less persuasive
had the testimony as to Snell's admissions been ex-
cluded. The admission into evidence of these statements,
therefore, was at most harmless error.
Affirmed. 
9
Justice Marshall's dissent, by contrast, expressed his views
that there was "clearly enough evidence to support either a find-
ing of voluntariness or one of coercion" in regard to Schneble's
confession; that it was "possible that the jury may have found the
statements to be involuntary and still relied on them;" and that,
unlike the majority, he could imagine jury findings rejecting
some or all of Schneble's statements or other evidence and rely-
ing primarily on the codefendant's statement to support the
conviction.0 " The outcome of the case thus turns on the differ-
ent conclusions concerning the reliability of the "untainted" evi-
dence by the majority and the dissent.101
99 405 U.S. at 431-32.
100Id. at 436-37.
101 It, of course, is error under the overwhelming evidence test as well to allow
evidence the jury may have disbelieved to sustain a finding of overwhelmingness. Yet In
re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 938
(1968), makes the same error in an overwhelming evidence context. In that case police
officers illegally obtained an extrajudicial admission from the accused, which was intro-
duced against him at trial. The California Court of Appeal thought there was a
reasonable possibility that the accused's decision to testify in his own behalf derived
from the illegal testimony and that his own testimony was extremely damaging to his
case. As the court put it:
Seated on the witness chair, he spun a fanciful exculpatory story, arousing the
jury's opinion he was almost certainly a liar and exposing himself to impeach-
ment by evidence of four prior felony convictions. If his courtroom position
had any hope of rescue, his decision to take the stand would have demolished
it.
Id. at 124, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 239. The Court of Appeal thus considered Cline's in-court
testimony as well as his extrajudicial statement as part of the tainted evidence and
deemed it highly incriminating. Nonetheless the court held the error harmless:
Viewed in relationship to the massive, immovable, independent evidence of
[Vol. 125:15
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People v. Coffey 10 2 provides another example of how an os-
tensibly prejudicial error can be excused by an appellate court's
independent evaluation of the probative value of untainted evi-
dence. Coffey was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon
upon several police officers. He denied that he had aimed
gunshots at any person or had intended to harm or to kill any-
one. A prior criminal conviction, which may have been obtained
unconstitutionally because of denial of counsel at trial, was
used to impeach Coffey's credibility. The California Supreme
Court held that, if the prior conviction was unconstitution-
al, its use to impeach was federal constitutional error. It held,
moreover, that the error was harmful with respect to counts
involving two of the police officers because no direct evidence
showed that the defendant had directed his fire at them or in-
tended to harm them; the prior conviction may therefore have
materially influenced the jury in finding against the defendant
on those points. With respect to counts involving two other
policemen, however, the court said the error could not reason-
ably have harmed the defendant because
there was precise and unequivocal testimony by the of-
ficers involved that defendant, when requested to drop
his weapon and surrender, turned and fired directly at
them. Further, there was physical evidence to the effect
that bullets fired at this time by defendant struck very
near the officers. Defendant's story, of course, was that
guilt, his decision [to testify] was harmless .... The guilt of the accused was
unassailably demonstrated by incontestable proof, independently of the error-
tinged evidence.
• Neither his inadmissible statement nor an adverse jury reaction to his
courtroom testimony could damage a case lost beyond repair.
Id. at 124-25, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
The problem with this reasoning, even under the overwhelming evidence test, is
that the untainted evidence was indisputable/uncontestable/overwhelming only on the
assumption that it was believed by the jury despite the accused's contradictions of it,
which the court adjudged to be "fanciful." Its characterization of the untainted evidence
as overwhelming thus depended on its assumption that the jury found the policemen
perfectly credible and Cline entirely incredible. Through this assumption the court at-
tributes to the triers of fact conclusions that they did not necessarily draw. Moreover,
the accused's inadmissible extrajudicial statement had particular bearing on one element
of the crime-the element requiring that the accused be aware of the officer's official
identity. With respect to this point, Cline can be seen as a cumulative evidence case
rather than an overwhelming evidence case, for there was untainted evidence that the
accused knew that the persons he was assaulting were officers: the officers testified that
they had announced their identities before firing a warning shot. It is not clear, how-
ever, that the jury found this element of the crime proved because it accepted the
officers' testimony or because instead, or in addition, it relied on the illegal evidence.
102 67 Cal. 2d 204, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1967).
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the officers opened fire upon him when he was trying
to surrender, and that he returned their fire and ran
back into the house. However, there was also evidence
to the effect that the officers were under explicit in-
structions not to fire upon defendant unless fired upon.
We also consider the fact that the jury was properly
instructed that the presumption of truth-telling on the
part of a witness may be repelled by the interest of that
witness in the case.
10 3
If the cumulative evidence test is generally less vulnerable
than the overwhelming evidence test to a charge of fostering
usurpation of jury functions, its superiority disappears when the
test is applied as in Schneble and Coffey. It may be, and probably
is, objectionable for an appellate court ever to hold that a jury
would necessarily find against the defendant on evidence essen-
tially different from the evidence actually before the jury that
has already convicted. But these cases go further and recreate
the thinking processes of the jury to accord with what the appel-
late court believes is the most rational way to view the evidence.
This difficulty inheres in a rule that allows an appellate court to
hold constitutional error harmless whenever duplicative evi-
dence itself must be believed beyond a reasonable doubt (in
other words, is indisputable); the appellate court usurps the
jury's function when it rules that the jury could not reasonably
have believed the tainted evidence and disbelieved the untainted
evidence.
The theory behind a rule that would require only that the
untainted evidence have superior probative force does, however,
have its adherents. Michael R. Fruehwald offers an explanation
of harmless error that is relevant in this context:
[F]rom the total record it is assumed that the jury ra-
tionally relies upon the most direct and persuasive evi-
dence to decide an issue and retreats to more remote
and less credible evidence only if it is needed to meet
strong evidence on the other side. If the evidence
against the defendant is overwhelming, the jury needs
only the best evidence to resolve its doubt. The weaker
the character and quality of the tainted evidence rela-
03 Id. at 223-24, 430 P.2d at 28, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 470 (footnote omitted). The same
error is made in Olivas v. Arizona ex rel. Eyman, 447 F.2d 974 (1971), which held a
Bruton error harmless because "[i]t did no more than restate what had already been
testified to by the eye witness." Id. at 976.
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tive to other evidence on the issue, the more probable
the jury was able to and did ignore it in reaching the
verdict. Under this model the issue is not whether there
is overwhelming evidence to convict, but rather whether
there is overwhelming evidence of a quality better than
that erroneously admitted.
10 4
The appellate court is viewed here as the final arbiter of credibil-
ity; the "pecking order" of evidence is determined according to
the court's perception of what constitutes "the most direct and
persuasive evidence." The encroachment on the jury's function
is even greater here than under the overwhelming evidence test
because the court is substituting its judgment (in theory, beyond
a reasonable doubt) to say not only what conclusion the jury
would have reached but also which evidence it would have be-
lieved and disbelieved in reaching that conclusion. In fact, the
less probative evidence may have played a role in the conviction
if the jury disbelieved the more probative evidence.
Even if one accepts an appellate court's ability accurately
(and constitutionally) to determine that the jury would not,
beyond a reasonable doubt, have believed the evidence the ap-
pellate court considers less probative unless it also believed the
evidence the appellate court considers more probative, the pos-
sibility exists that it was the effect of the two pieces of evidence
together that persuaded the jury to believe both. Assume, for
example, a case involving the admission of two confessions by
the same defendant-the second violative of Miranda, the first
properly admitted. The issue is whether the unconstitutionally
admitted confession was harmless. The confessions are much
alike, the first (and proper) one being somewhat more detailed.
The defense questioned the voluntariness (and consequent reli-
ability) of both confessions, presenting to the jury a more con-
vincing case with respect to the second, improper confession
than the first. The proper evidence therefore is clearly superior
to the improper evidence in probative value, and the confes-
sions, in terms of degree of similarity, can be seen as cumulative.
But even if it is reasonable to find (beyond a reasonable doubt)
that the jury could not have credited the tainted confession with-
out crediting the untainted confession, the possibility clearly ex-
104 Note, Miranda Warnings and the Harmless Error Doctrine: Comments on the Indiana
Approach, 47 IND. L. J. 331, 333-34 n.16 (1971). Although Fruehwald wrote about the
overwhelming evidence test, his point is relevant in connection with cumulative evi-
dence as well.
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ists that the jury would have disbelieved the proper confession
had it been the only one in the case and that the improper con-
fession tipped the balance against the defendant. It is possible,
then, that improper evidence will add together with proper evi-
dence to have an incriminating impact if only superior probative
value is demanded of the untainted evidence. Accordingly, the
cumulative evidence test should require that the untainted evi-
dence be indisputable, in addition to imposing requirements of
similarity between the tainted and untainted evidence.
3. The Problem of Fruits
Another possible interrelationship between the tainted and
the untainted evidence that the cumulative evidence test should
recognize is that the untainted evidence may derive, in whole or
in part, from the tainted evidence. This interrelationship may
exist whether or not the untainted evidence is disputable.
Whenever it does exist, the tainted evidence may have played a
role in the conviction. In fact, if "untainted" evidence does de-
rive from the tainted evidence, both should be considered
tainted; the problem lies basically in accurately separating the
tainted from the untainted evidence in the first instance. It is
important, both to the cumulative evidence test and to the over-
whelming evidence test, that "untainted" evidence not derive
from tainted evidence. Otherwise the constitutional error is al-
lowed to play a part in the conviction and still be called harmless.
Yet many cases ignore this seemingly elementary point. In Fahy
v. Connecticut,'°5 for example, it seems quite possible that the
"untainted" evidence, on which the state court relied to uphold
the conviction, in fact derived from the illegal search and sei-
zure, and the Supreme Court so found. 0 6 In Motes v. United
States10 7 as well, the petitioner's in-court confession probably de-
rived from the erroneously admitted accusation of him. The
transcript of Taylor's earlier accusations, as part of the
105 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
106 The Court said that the illegal evidence was corroborative of police testimony
(that otherwise might not have been believed), that it was the basis of opinion testimony
that the paint and brush matched the markings on the synagogue, and that it might
have induced Fahy's confession. Id. at 86-87. If authority is needed for the proposition
that evidence should not be deemed untainted if it derives from the tainted evidence,
Fahy provides it, for in assessing the effect of the tainted evidence, the Court examines
its effect "upon the other evidence adduced at trial and upon the conduct of the
defense." Id. at 87.
10' 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
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prosecution's case, probably preceded Motes' testimony, which
was placed in evidence by the defense, 10 8 and quite possibly
Motes would have had no reason to testify except for the er-
roneously admitted statements; the Court's opinion does not dis-
close other evidence of guilt of any of the accused.'0 9 (In
Harrington, a derivative relationship seems less likely because the
defendant's statement was made before trial, and the Bruton vio-
lation occurred at trial." 0 )
4. Summary
Three requisite elements of the cumulative evidence test
have been suggested: (1) There should be substantial similiarity,
in type of evidence and incriminating factual details, between the
tainted evidence and the untainted evidence of which it is
"cumulative." (2) The untainted evidence should be indisputable,
either because the facts are in some way affirmatively accepted
by the defendant or for other reasons. (3) Care should be taken
that the "untainted" evidence in no way derives from the tainted
evidence.
D. Evaluation of the Cumulative Evidence Test Thus Defined
People v. Jacobson,"' a California Supreme Court case, would
suggest that the proposed limitations on the cumulative evidence
test make it too narrow. In that case, the court found roughly
ten separate confessions by the defendant that he had murdered
his baby daughter. The majority found voluntary and spontane-
ous the first eight confessions, six of which were made to people
other than the police. The last two confessions, however, were
constitutionally impermissible, having been extracted in violation
of Escobedo v. Illinois."2 According to the majority, all the confes-
108 The Court also says that the erroneously introduced evidence was the first evi-
dence of conspiracy introduced in the case. Id. at 471. Motes' evidence also attested to a
conspiracy.
109 Similarly, in Vasquez v. State, 254 Ind. 472, 260 N.E.2d 779 (1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1012 (1971), and Greer v. State, 252 Ind. 20, 245 N.E.2d 158 (1969), discussed
in note 86 supra, in which the defendants admitted at trial the facts introduced against
them in statements violative of Miranda, the "untainted" evidence may have derived
from the constitutional error.
110 Even in this situation, however, a defendant's failure to dispute his own state-
ment at trial could conceivably result from the Bruton violation.
111 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015
(1965).
112 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Quaere why the prosecution should have introduced the
clearly questionable confessions in such an apparently airtight case. Cf. note 56 supra.
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sions were identical in incriminating content. Moreover, no one
confession was unduly emphasized at the guilt phase of the trial.
The majority therefore held the two improper confessions
"merely cumulative" of the prior admissible statements, noting
that the sequence of the confessions was such that the proper
ones could not have derived from the improper ones. 113
If one accepts the majority's version of the facts, 114 this hold-
ing appears sensible. Yet the "undisputed/indisputable" criterion
is not met. For the defendant did contradict the series of confes-
sions when he took the stand, saying that he suffered a period of
"blackness" after which he discovered his daughter dead." 5 If
we persist with our three criteria for the cumulative evidence
test, therefore, it seems impossible to hold the last two confes-
sions harmless under that test, even though the usual reasons
for questioning a court's finding of cumulativeness when the
untainted evidence is in dispute do not seem to apply. They do
not apply because the similarity of the evidence is so great (ac-
cording to the majority's version of the facts) and because the
number of confessions is so great that it is difficult to believe that
the tainted confessions had an independent impact. Both factors
are crucial to creating a situation in which we would not wish to
apply the proposed cumulative evidence limitations; and it is also
crucial that the tainted confessions were the last in the series. If
the case were less extraordinary, in the sense that two or three
confessions were involved rather than ten, the cumulative evi-
dence test should not apply, because of the danger that the con-
fessions were accepted over the trial testimony only because they
"1363 Cal. 2d at 330-31, 405 P.2d at 563, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 523. Prior toJacobson, the
use of unconstitutional confessions was subject to automatic reversal in California
courts. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. App. 2d 350, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965). Perhaps when cumulativeness is the harmless error test,
however, a different category of automatically reversible error is mandated than when
another test of harmlessness is used. (In note 56 & text accompanying notes 54-60 supra,
we saw, by analogy, differences in the automatic reversal problem depending upon
whether the first approach or an overwhelming evidence test was used.) Allowing a
harmless error finding when the erroneously admitted confession is cumulative with a
confession of the same defendant certainly does not seem inconsistent with refusing to
allow it simply because the weight of other evidence in the case is overwhelming.
114 The dissenter disagreed with the majority not only concerning whether an ille-
gally obtained confession could ever be harmless but also concerning whether the ma-
jority was correct in deeming the first few statements made to police officers to be
wholly voluntary.
... 63 Cal. 2d at 333, 405 P.2d at 564, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 524. To say that the un-
tainted evidence was nonetheless "indisputable" because the case against the defendant
was so strong would emasculate this requirement of the cumulative evidence test.
Therefore, the evidence must be considered disputable because it was in fact disputed.
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reinforced each other. Moreover, if the tainted confession is at
the beginning of a series of confessions, instead of at the end,
then, no matter how long the series, the later confessions may
derive from the earlier improper one. In addition, the more the
tainted confessions differ from the untainted ones, the more
likely it is that they had a different impact on the jury, and thus
could reasonably have been determinative in causing rejection of
the trial testimony.
The contradiction between the result that seems sensible on
the facts ofJacobson and the proposed limitations on the cumula-
tive evidence test should not result in a rejection of the limita-
tions, for the need for them exists in the vast majority of cases.
Tailoring the rule instead to accommodate the rare situation
found in Jacobson might lead in the general run of cases to the
abuses found in Schneble and Coffey. The danger of making an
explicit exception to cover theJacobson situation is that its terms
would be interpreted to include cases with facts less compelling
than Jacobson, and hence the exception would come to swallow
the rule, or at least part of it.
Whichever way one comes out on this admittedly debatable
issue, it is important to enunciate the requirements of the
cumulative evidence test-and any exceptions to those require-
ments that might exist-in order to give content to the test. This
is vital if the test is to be retained at all, either in conjunction
with both of the other tests, or merely with the first of them."'
If the strict requirements suggested above are imposed, the
cumulative evidence test is a sensible means for determining the
harmlessness of error. Under it, appellate court encroachment
upon the province of the jury is far less substantial than under
the overwhelming evidence test.1 7 Findings of harmlessness also
are more reviewable under this test than under the overwhelm-
ing evidence test: an appellate court need only examine the
tainted evidence and the particular untainted evidence with
which the error is allegedly cumulative-evidence that those
urging harmlessness can be expected to point out. It seems
116 Even if the overwhelming evidence test is retained as well, there are some cases
in which the cumulative evidence test would allow a finding of harmlessness while other
tests would not. The argument for retaining the test in these cases weakens, however, in
view of the small number of cases in which cumulativeness, properly applied, would
allow a finding of harmlessness while neither of the other tests would. Affirmance in
that narrow category of cases might not be worth the costs of retaining the test, with all
of its pitfalls and litigable issues.
1
7 See text accompanying note 82 supra.
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proper not to overturn a conviction and require a new trial in
cases in which this strict definition of cumulativeness is met, for
the constitutional error appears truly to have played no role in
procuring the conviction.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether or not the Supreme Court intends that
the cumulative evidence test be viewed as a distinct means of
assessing harmlessness. As noted earlier, the Court in Harrington
does not state clearly whether the similarity between the un-
tainted and the tainted evidence is important to its holding of
harmlessness or whether the overwhelming quality of the un-
tainted evidence is alone responsible for the result."t 8 Lower
courts and commentators have accordingly differed in their
readings of Harrington.1 9 And Harrington is the Supreme Court
case that to date most clearly enunciates a cumulative evidence
test. In this respect, Harrington provides a good example both of
the confusion regarding harmless error generally and of the
Court's failure to differentiate between various processes of de-
termining harmlessness even though those processes can lead to
different results. The dissent in Harrington, authored by Mr.
Justice Brennan, has the same difficulty as the majority opinion.
It begins by criticizing the majority for confusing quite different
approaches. Viewing the majority's opinion as endorsing the
overwhelming evidence test, it contains the most coherent ex-
egesis to be found in Supreme Court opinions of the difference
between the first approach and the overwhelming evidence
118 Indeed, the last four sentences quoted in text accompanying note 72 supra, may
state that cumulativeness alone is not sufficient to render evidence harmless if that evi-
dence would be dearly harmful under the first approach to harmless error and that
only overwhelming untainted evidence can render such errors harmless.
Other cases, in addition to Harrington, confuse the cumulativeness and the over-
whelming evidence tests, and treat them as fungible. E.g., Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). See also Milton v. Wain-
wright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), an overwhelming evidence case that could have been
analyzed as a cumulative evidence case.
I" Some support the cumulative evidence reading. State v. Martin, 107 Ariz. 444,
448-49, 489 P.2d 254, 258-59 (1971); In re Lara, 1 Cal. 3d 486, 489-90, 462 P.2d 380,
382, 82 Cal. Rptr. 628, 630-31 (1969); Note, The Admission of a Codefendant's Confession
After Bruton v. United States: The Questions and a Proposal for Their Resolution, 1970
DuKE L.J. 329, 344-50. The majority of cases considering Harrington, however, treat it
as an overwhelming evidence case. E.g., Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 537 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); United States v. Young, 422 F.2d 302, 308 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970). See also Note, Application of the Harmless Error Doctrine:
Comments on the Indiana Approach, 69 MICH. L. REV. 941, 943-44 (1971); 83 HARV. L.
REv. 814, 819-20 (1970).
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test, which it claims Chapman repudiated. 12 0 But after so care-
fully differentiating between the overwhelming evidence ap-
proach and the first approach that does not allow "plainly
relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury" to be
deemed harmless and that insists "that a conviction cannot con-
stitutionally be based to any extent on constitutional error,"
the dissent then asserts that "[t]he focus of appellate inquiry
should be on the character and quality of the tainted evidence as
it relates to the untainted evidence and not just on the amount of
untainted evidence.''
12
1
Here, Justice Brennan drifts away from the pure first ap-
proach he advocates at the beginning of his opinion and elides
the various tests. The ensuing portions of the opinion suggest
that Justice Brennan will not look merely to whether the un-
constitutional evidence was of a type likely to influence the jury,
but also will discount the evidence if its effect is duplicated by
other untainted evidence in the case. In a way that suggests
the cumulative evidence test, he examines the difference between
the untainted evidence against Harrington and the tainted evi-
dence, which he believes is fuller and more probative. 122 Yet his
discussion has not recognized the cumulative evidence test as a
distinct means of assessing harmlessness. Like the majority,
120 In Chapman, we ... emphasized that "[a]n error in admitting plainly rele-
vant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot
. .. be conceived of as harmless." . . . [W]e left no doubt that for an error to
be "harmless" it must have made no contribution to a criminal conviction.
Chapman, then, meant no compromise with the proposition that a convic-
tion cannot constitutionally be based to any extent on constitutional error. The
Court today by shifting the inquiry from whether the constitutional error con-
tributed to the conviction to whether the untainted evidence provided 'over-
whelming' support for the conviction puts aside the firm resolve of Chapman
and makes that compromise....
The Court holds that constitutional error in the trial of a criminal offense
may be held harmless if there is 'overwhelming' untainted evidence to support
the conviction. The approach, however, was expressly rejected in Chapman ...
and with good reason. For where the inquiry concerns the extent of accumula-
tion of untainted evidence rather than the impact of tainted evidence on the
jury's decision, convictions resulting from constitutional error may be insulated
from attack. By its nature, the issue of substantiality of evidence admits of only
the most limited kind of appellate review. Thus, the Court's rule will often
effectively leave the vindication of constitutional rights solely in the hands of
trial judges. If, instead, the task of appellate courts is to appraise the impact of
tainted evidence on a jury's decision, as Chapman required, these courts will be
better able to protect against deprivations of constitutional rights of criminal
defendants.
395 U.S. at 255-56 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).12 Id. at 256 (emphasis supplied).
12 2 d at 256-57.
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therefore, Justice Brennan does not differentiate clearly between
the separate ways of assessing harmlessness.
Both opinions in Harrington therefore illustrate the confu-
sion of harmless error tests that characterizes Supreme Court
opinions generally. 123 Nor do the three different tests we have
examined exhaust the possibilities. Another test alluded to in
one case is a compare-the-weight-of-the-evidence approach,
124
an approach that has dramatic potential for appellate displace-
ment of jury deliberations. And other tests are possible as well.
This Article supports retention of the first approach-an
examination of the persuasiveness of the erroneously admitted
evidence-accompanied only by a narrow cumulative evidence
test. In other words, constitutional error should be declared
harmless only when the error itself was either irrelevant or triv-
ial, or when other independent, substantially similar evidence
indisputably proved the propositions to which the tainted evi-
dence was relevant. The most obvious criticism of this position is
that it is too narrow because it prevents holdings of harmlessness
in certain appropriate situations. Two examples discussed above
are theJacobson case 125 and the hypothetical in which the pros-
ecution introduces into evidence photographs of a robbery in
commission but also introduces illegally obtained evidence. In
order for harmless error rulings to be possible in such situations
(and in others in which "common sense" might tell us that the
123 The difference between the majority's and the dissent's readings of the
Harrington record, see note 87 supra, is not unusual in harmless error cases, for the
majority and dissenting opinions often reflect important differences in factual analyses.
See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405
U.S. 427, 434-37 (1972); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 n.16 (1968);
People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 336-42, 405 P.2d 555, 566-70, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515,
526-30 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015 (1966). (When only one opinion is written,
questionable factual analysis may not be apparent.) Even if consensus were reached as
to the proper harmless error test, therefore, it is likely that questionable factual analysis
would continue to be a source of arbitrary harmless error results. The first
approach-focusing on the error alone to see if it is of a type likely to be influential
with the jury-probably lends itself less to differing factual analyses than does either of
the others.
124 See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972). The Court does not distin-
guish between such an approach and the overwhelming evidence test, stating that "[i]n
some cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudi-
cial effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless error."
(emphasis supplied). See also In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 938 (1968), discussed in note 101 supra; text accompanying note
121 supra.
12' Notes 111-17 supra & accompanying text.
[Vol. 125:15
HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR
result of the case would not have been determinatively affected
by avoidance of the constitutional error), one might prefer the
current amalgam of half-articulated tests and doctrines to the
formulation of any precise harmless error rules. For it is difficult
to design rules that would include all those cases in which find-
ings of harmlessness would seem appropriate, while excluding
all others. 126 The difficulty with that position is that it essentially
argues against the rule of law in this area. It permits highly
arbitrary results and does not allow the case law to develop to
correct shortcomings that are perceived in the rules, because it
does not force elucidation and discussion of the real variables
that go into a particular decision whether to hold error harmless.
I would prefer some underinclusiveness in the harmless error
doctrine, especially because the prosecution often could avoid
reversal by simply not committing the constitutional error in the
first instance. 127 Indeed, in my mind, the comparative merits of
the various alternatives discussed-the principal issue being
whether or not to retain an overwhelming evidence test-are less
clear than the desirability of enunciating what test or tests are to
govern and the requirements of each. Only when that is done
will it be possible for an appellate court operating in good faith
to apply the harmless error test or tests in a principled fashion.
And open discussion of the actual reasons for harmless error
decisions should allow categories to evolve that more dearly and
correctly dispose of harmless error problems.
126 Another possible fear is that the unavailability of harmless error rulings will lead
courts to undermine the constitutional rules themselves when faced with convictions
they want to preserve. It is not difficult to document the interdependence of findings
of error and findings of harmlessness. Indeed, in some cases the court blurs its find-
ings, not informing us whether no error occurred or whether instead there was con-
stitutional error but it was harmless. E.g., Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972);
United States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
127 This, of course, will not be true in those cases in which constitutional error
appears only in light of a subsequent court ruling that is applied retroactively. See
generally note 56supra.
